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ABSTRACT 
The question whether intellectual property (“IP”) rights should require use is a 
pressing one today.  Neither patent nor copyright law formally requires that the IP 
owner actually use the patented invention or copyrighted work.  Yet use would seem 
necessary for a work to reap the social benefits that justify granting exclusive rights.  
Trademark law does require use, but it sometimes protects marks even when mark 
owners have ceased using them.   
This messy state of affairs has come under considerable pressure in recent years.  
Critics condemn patent assertion entities, commonly known as patent trolls, for 
asserting patents that they do not commercialize or use themselves, and some of these 
critics advocate a general use requirement to handle the problem.  In copyright, the 
problem of orphan works has become particularly salient with the rise of digital 
technology and user-generated content, and the optimal solution involves tricky 
questions bearing on use.  Trademark law also exhibits confusion about use and 
nonuse in the area of trademark abandonment.  In particular, courts have been 
unable to develop a coherent approach to abandonment by nonuse when the 
abandoned mark retains substantial residual goodwill. 
This Article breaks new ground by focusing on use from the perspective of the 
utilitarian and nonutilitarian theories that justify IP rights and by using this 
perspective to develop a general framework for analyzing questions of use and 
nonuse across patent, copyright, and trademark law.  When the issues are examined 
at the normative level, it becomes clear that a general rule conditioning IP rights on 
use across-the-board is not desirable.  Any use requirement should be tailored to the 
nature of the specific problems that nonuse creates.  In keeping with this insight, the 
Article examines the patent troll, orphan work, and residual goodwill problems and 
proposes sensible solutions tailored to each. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many types of intellectual property rights in the United States do not require use.  
The author of an original work of authorship, for example, has federal copyright 
rights in her work even if she chooses not to publish, license, or otherwise use it.1  
While there was a time when patent owners had to work their patents,2 the owner of 
a patented invention today can sue for patent infringement even if she does not 
commercialize, license, or otherwise use her invention productively.3 And trademark 
law, while it requires an owner to use the mark in trade, sometimes protects marks 
after owners cease to use them.4  
On one view, none of this is terribly surprising.  If intellectual property (“IP”) is 
property, one might argue, the owner of IP has a right to do with it as she pleases, 
including doing nothing at all.5  This simple view of IP as property, however, begs 
the question of what rights IP law should confer.  It assumes that labeling something 
“property” necessarily means that the owner has an absolute right to do whatever she 
wants with it.  But property rights are not absolute.  IP rights, in particular, promote 
certain values and purposes, and those values and purposes place limits on their 
scope.  The question is whether use should be one of those limits. 
Once one gets past the absolutist view of intellectual property, it is not obvious 
why the law should protect IP that is not used.  The standard normative account of 
patent, copyright, and trademark in the United States is utilitarian, and utilitarian 
theory values IP rights for the social benefits they confer.6  It is difficult see how 
society can benefit unless IP is used, perhaps even used publicly.  For example, the 
utilitarian theory of patent and copyright focuses on encouraging creativity:  the law 
gives creators exclusive rights in their creations in order to incentivize inventions 
 
 1. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (noting in a case involving state taxation 
of copyright royalties that “[t]he owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or 
licensing and content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his property”); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (requiring only originality and fixation). 
 2. For the history of working requirements in different countries, see Marketa Trimble, Patent 
Working Requirements:  Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 483, 487–96 
(2016). 
 3. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378−79 (1945); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper 
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).   
 4. See infra Part III (discussing abandonment and residual goodwill).  There are other examples, 
too.  For instance, the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) follows the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA) in formally protecting trade secrets without any explicit use requirement.  Defend Trade Secrets 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2016) (defining “trade secret” without regard to use); Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (same).  Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST. 1939) (requiring that the secret information be “used in one’s business),” with 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (omitting this requirement). 
 5. This view seems to underlie the pivotal Supreme Court decision rejecting a use requirement for 
patent rights.  See Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 424 (stating that when the inventor discovers 
something of value, “it is his absolute property”).  
 6. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 6th ed. 2016) (“Utilitarian theory and the 
economic framework built upon it have long provided the dominant paradigm for analyzing and justifying 
the various forms of intellectual property protection.”). 
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and works of authorship for society’s benefit.7  But how can society benefit when an 
author or inventor refuses to share or use her IP?8  Trademark law is not about 
incentives to create, but it is about protecting source-identifying symbols,9 and a 
symbol must be used in trade before it can become a source identifier.10  
As we shall see, the utilitarian analysis of nonuse is more complicated than this 
quick review suggests.  Moreover, utilitarianism is not the only normative theory 
relevant to IP law.11  In Part II, I review the most important normative theories 
underlying IP law in the United States and their implications for nonuse:  an 
incentive-based utilitarian theory for patent law, a mix of utilitarian, Lockean, and 
personhood theories for copyright, and an efficiency-based theory for trademark.  As 
for patent, a careful analysis of the benefits and costs of requiring use shows that an 
across-the-board use requirement is undesirable, although a more limited use 
requirement makes sense.12  As for copyright, the utilitarian rationale supports a 
limited use requirement just as it does for patent.  But nonutilitarian theories have 
greater force in the copyright field and they might seem opposed to requiring use.  
Yet on closer examination they too can support meaningful limits on copyright rights 
when a work is not used.13  Finally, while the normative arguments for a use 
requirement are strongest in trademark law, there are reasons for extending limited 
trademark protection to some cases of nonuse.14     
Considering use and nonuse in light of IP law’s underlying normative theories is 
important for resolving a number of concrete problems today.  Some critics 
complain, for example, about firms—so-called “patent assertion entities” (PAEs), or 
more derisively, “patent trolls”—that purchase patents not to use them, but to assert 
them against others who make productive use.15  These critics point to the fact that 
PAEs benefit greatly from the rule that patentees can enforce their patents without 
 
 7. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (noting that copyright and 
patent rights are not granted primarily to reward the creator but rather to secure “the general benefits 
derived by the public from the labors of authors.”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975) (noting that “the ultimate aim [of copyright law] is, by this incentive [i.e., reward to the 
creator], to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”).   
 8. See, e.g., Alireza Chavosh, Patent Nonuse:  Are Patent Pools a Possible Solution? 3 (Univ. 
Cal., Berkeley – Coleman Fung Inst. for Eng’g Leadership, Working Paper, July 7, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/MC92-DVPW (“if patents are not used they support the [patent] monopoly without 
providing any social and economic benefits since the innovations based on those patents are not eventually 
exploited”). 
 9. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995); 1 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (5th ed. 2017) [hereinafter 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. 
 10. 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 16:18. 
 11. See MERGES ET AL, supra note 6, at III-17, IV-11. 
 12. See infra Section II.A. 
 13. See infra Section II.B. 
 14. See infra Section II.C.   
 15. PAEs are a subset of a larger category known as non-practicing entities (NPEs).  NPEs also 
include universities and research institutions that license rather than practice their patents on their own.  
See generally Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley & Melamed, Trolls].   
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using them.16  So too, the orphan work problem often pits a copyright owner who 
has ceased using the work—and might even have forgotten all about it—against 
someone who wants to make a productive use but who cannot secure permission 
because she cannot identify the owner.  And courts struggle with cases where 
consumers still rely on a mark to identify the trademark owner’s products even after 
the owner has stopped using the mark.  The normative status of nonuse figures 
prominently in all three areas. 
This Article explores the complicated relationship between nonuse and IP rights.17  
Although it is not the first to analyze nonuse,18 it is the first to construct a general 
approach to issues of use and nonuse across all three major IP fields (patent, 
copyright, and trademark) based on a systematic analysis of the range of utilitarian 
and nonutilitarian theories justifying IP rights.  It also applies this general framework 
to PAEs, orphan works, and abandoned marks with residual goodwill.  The need for 
this type of analysis is particularly pressing in today’s world of digital technology.  
PAE suits, for example, typically involve information technology and software 
patents, and the most serious problems with orphan works stem from new uses made 
possible by digitization.19   
The main body of this Article is divided into three parts.  Part I lays the 
groundwork for later discussion by clarifying what is meant by “use” and “nonuse” 
and outlining a typology of the most salient forms of IP nonuse.  Part II explores the 
normative status of nonuse in IP law.  Section II.A focuses on patent law; Section 
II.B on copyright law, and Section II.C on trademark law.  This discussion shows 
that nonuse is problematic for different reasons depending on the type of IP and the 
policies driving the particular IP theory.  In particular, it challenges those who 
advocate an across-the-board use requirement for patent rights, as well as those who 
argue that use should not be required at all.  Similarly, it shows that imposing a 
limited use requirement on copyright enforcement is compatible with copyright law 
not only as a means to incentivize creativity, but also as a way to protect Lockean 
and personhood rights.  And it explains why, notwithstanding the primacy of use in 
trademark law, the normative basis for trademark rights sometimes favors protecting 
marks without use. 
Part III then explores the implications of Part II’s analysis for the concrete 
problems of PAEs, copyright-protected orphan works, and trademark abandonment.  
 
 16. See Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Penalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1439-40, 1442, 1451 (2013).  
 17. The analysis is normative and does not take account of international treaty obligations.  It is 
worth noting that the legal implications of nonuse are also complicated for tangible property.  Ordinarily 
we do not condemn a landowner for holding land for speculation, but these attitudes can change in times 
of scarcity or rapid growth when land becomes an important input to the generation of social wealth.  See, 
e.g., id. at 1464–65 (noting that this was the case in some areas of the American west during the nineteenth 
century).  They can also change when vacant land attracts blight to an urban area.  Id. (describing cities’ 
use of eminent domain and the imposition of higher taxes to encourage development of vacant land).  
 18. Professors Liivak and Penalver evaluate the legal significance of nonuse in the patent field.  See 
id.  I draw on their work to some extent, but also criticize and modify their analysis in important ways, 
expand on it, and address nonuse issues in copyright and trademark law as well.  
 19. See infra Part III. 
BONE, WHAT’S WRONG WITH NOT USING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2018) 
6 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:1 
It argues for a qualified use requirement as part of the solution to PAEs.  It explains 
why the conventional approaches to the orphan works problem, which focus on 
providing compensation to copyright owners, are misguided and why orphan-work 
copyright owners should not be allowed to enforce their copyrights against third 
party users.  And it offers an approach to abandoned marks with residual goodwill 
that better implements the core policies underlying trademark law. 
I. PRELIMINARIES 
It is important to be clear about terminology at the outset.  The following 
discussion first defines more precisely what I mean by “intellectual property.”  It 
then clarifies the concept of “use” and distinguishes use from mere assertion of IP 
rights.  The discussion closes by identifying four important types of IP nonuse.  
Throughout the discussion, I endeavor to keep the definitions as free of normative 
content as possible, so the concepts can be applied to all the theories explored in Part 
II.   
A. “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY” 
Courts and commentators often employ the terms “intellectual property” and “IP” 
loosely, sometimes to refer to a particular invention, work, or mark, and sometimes 
to refer to the legal rights that attach to the invention, work, or mark.  In this Article, 
I employ these terms in the first sense—to denote an actual invention, work, or mark.  
I refer to the legal rights that attach to creations as “IP rights,” or more specifically, 
as “patent rights,” “copyright rights,” and “trademark rights.”  As we shall see, this 
usage best fits the way courts and commentators frame the nonuse problem today.20   
B.  “USE”  
In general, a person uses IP when that person does something to realize at least 
some of the IP’s value.  The value of IP can be economic or noneconomic.  The 
noneconomic value of an invention, for example, lies in its ability to accomplish a 
useful result and this noneconomic value also gives it economic value.  It follows 
that a firm “uses” an invention whenever it makes and sells products that incorporate 
the invention, takes steps to improve on the invention, applies the invention to 
research, or engages in other value-generating activities involving the invention.  On 
the artistic side, a painting with a potential market has economic value, and the same 
painting has noneconomic value as a form of aesthetic expression for the artist and a 
source of pleasure and meaning.  Thus, a painter “uses” her painting when she hangs 
it on the wall and enjoys contemplating it, displays it publicly, sells prints, and so on.  
As for trademarks, a firm “uses” a mark when it sells goods or services bearing the 
mark.   
 
 20. When critics worry about IP nonuse, they envision an owner of IP rights asserting those rights 
against others without making, selling, developing, or otherwise using the underlying invention, work, or 
mark.  See infra Part III. 
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To understand current debates over IP nonuse, it is important to distinguish 
between using IP and using IP rights.  In particular, the act of asserting IP rights, 
whether by threatening or filing suit, does not alone constitute IP “use,” as I employ 
the term here.  For example, a patent troll uses its patent rights by asserting them 
against others, but it does not use the specific invention protected by those rights.  So 
too, the owner of the copyright in an orphan work asserts her copyright rights against 
others even after ceasing all use of the work.  And a firm can stop using a mark but 
still be able to assert trademark rights when the mark has residual goodwill.   
It is also important to distinguish between use by the IP owner and use by others.  
The question addressed in this Article is whether an IP owner should be able to assert 
its rights against others when it doesn’t use the IP itself.  The fact that others use the 
IP does not necessarily mean that the IP owner also uses it.  
This point raises a question of considerable importance to the analysis of nonuse:  
When does licensing qualify as use on the part of the IP owner-licensor?  The answer 
depends on whether the owner actively seeks a licensee to develop and exploit the 
IP.  To illustrate, suppose a university research department comes up with an 
invention and obtains a patent on it.  The university cannot commercialize the 
invention on its own so it takes affirmative steps to find a company willing to license 
the patent and pay royalties to the university.  One might argue that the university is 
not an IP user as the term is defined here if the university merely relies on its patent 
rights to negotiate a license.  However, the university does more than that.  Unable 
to commercialize the invention itself, the university actively seeks a firm to do the 
job on the university’s behalf and partly for its benefit.21  
The university is a user because the university, for all practical purposes, acts with 
the company that licenses the patent for the purpose of commercializing the 
invention.  More generally, an IP owner-licensor is a “user” when its relationship 
with the licensee justifies attributing the licensee’s use in significant part to it.  It 
follows that purely passive licensing is not use.  For example, a copyright owner is 
not a user just because another party obtains a compulsory license to use the work 
and pays royalties to the owner.22  In that case, the copyright owner does nothing to 
engage the licensee and might not even want the license at all. 
 
 21. Sometimes universities sit on their patents rather than try to license them and sue others when 
they use the invention unaware of the university’s prior patent rights.  In that case, the university engages 
in what I later call “strategic nonuse” and acts as a patent troll.  See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities 
Patent Trolls, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008).  But that is not our 
hypothetical. 
 22. The Copyright Act includes a number of compulsory licensing schemes in which someone who 
wishes to copy and use a copyrighted work can do so without the copyright owner’s permission as long 
as she complies with the statutory requirements and pays the prescribed licensing fee.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 
§ 115 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (creating a compulsory licensing regime for nondramatic 
musical works). 
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C. A TYPOLOGY OF “NONUSE”  
It will be useful to distinguish among four general types of IP nonuse:  complete 
nonuse, temporary nonuse, strategic nonuse, and functional nonuse.  These four types 
cover most of the cases of IP nonuse today.23 
“Complete nonuse” refers to a situation in which the IP owner sets the IP aside 
and does nothing at all with it.  The IP might not be valuable enough to interest 
anyone in using it, or the IP owner might have idiosyncratic reasons for ignoring it.  
For example, an inventor might store her unmarketable invention in the garage and 
never look at it again, or a poet might file her poem in her computer’s hard drive or 
place it on a shelf to collect dust and never read it to others, attempt to publish it, or 
otherwise use it. 
“Temporary nonuse” covers situations in which the IP owner is not currently 
using the IP but has definite plans to use it in the future.  The reason for nonuse is to 
prepare the IP for future use, such as by laying the groundwork for publication, 
creating the infrastructure for commercialization, or setting the stage for licensing.  
It is critical that the IP owner who is engaged in temporary nonuse actually have 
plans for use in the reasonably foreseeable future and that the period of nonuse is 
reasonably related to implementation of those plans.24  For example, a novelist who 
sits on her novel indefinitely in the hope that conditions become more favorable for 
publication sometime in the future is a complete nonuser, not a temporary nonuser.  
However, she can become a temporary nonuser if conditions change and she takes 
steps to publish the work.  
“Strategic nonuse” includes scenarios, like those involving PAEs or patent trolls, 
in which the IP owner has no bona fide intent to develop the IP herself or to license 
it as part of a plan to commercialize or develop it in the definite future.25  The IP 
owner instead seeks to profit from strategically deploying its IP rights.  For example, 
one of the main reasons a patent troll chooses nonuse is to facilitate the element of 
surprise essential to its holdup strategy.26  It sits on its patent until another firm makes 
 
 23. See generally Chavosh, supra note 8, at 3, 5–6 (noting that the literature distinguishes between 
sleeping and strategic patents, where “sleeping patents” are patents that are “left completely unused” and 
“strategic patents” are patents that are unused for strategic purposes). 
 24. See Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 1473 (distinguishing “purposeful and self-consciously 
temporary nonuse as part of a longer-term marketing strategy” from “permanent or indefinite nonuse”). 
 25. This is different than using a patent to suppress an invention, say, in order to maximize profits 
from an existing market.  See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908); 
6A CHISUM ON PATENTS §19.04[3][l](2017); Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public 
Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391–400, 402–17 (2002) 
(collecting examples of suppression).  In contrast to a strategic nonuser, an IP owner engaged in 
suppression has no interest in licensing and does not care about damages unless the prospect of paying 
damages discourages other firms from using the patented invention.  
 26. Another reason is to avoid the cost of developing and marketing the patented invention.  
“Holdup” refers to a strategy in which an owner of patent rights in a component of a multi-component 
device waits until the manufacturer makes irreversible investments and then asserts its patent to block the 
device from being manufactured and sold.  The seller of the device has an incentive to pay the patentee 
much more than the amount the patented technology adds to the value of the device if the alternative is an 
injunction against marketing the device at all.  When there are thousands of components covered by 
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irreversible investments in a product that has an arguably infringing component, and 
then springs the patent on the surprised user, threatens suit, and demands payment in 
excess of the patent’s value.27 
In contrast to a complete nonuser, the strategic nonuser seeks to exploit its IP and 
refrains from use because nonuse is essential to its strategy.  In contrast to a 
temporary nonuser, the strategic nonuser has no definite plans to use its IP in the 
reasonably foreseeable future; it merely lays in wait until someone else uses it.  In 
fact, a strategic nonuser never becomes a user even if its litigation threats succeed in 
securing a license.  This is because the strategic nonuser does nothing to seek out a 
licensee. 
Finally, “functional nonuse” refers to situations where an IP owner uses a patent 
or copyright for a purpose that does not fit how the relevant body of IP law 
contemplates use.  The best examples come from patent law.  In these cases, the 
patentee does not sell, license, or otherwise commercially exploit or develop the 
invention, as the theory behind patent law assumes (so the inventor can recoup its 
fixed invention costs).28  Instead, the patentee uses the patent for other purposes that 
arguably do not fit patent law, such as signaling information to the public about the 
firm and its research and development program.29   
Technically, this is not “use” of the invention itself according to my definition.  
At the same time, it is something different than simply asserting IP rights.  The 
invention in fact is used, but not directly.  It is used to obtain a patent and then the 
patent, along with the description of the invention in the patent, is used to convey 
information about the firm.  This activity is hard to classify because it employs the 
patent, and indirectly the invention, to serve a purpose beyond what the patent law 
contemplates.  For this reason, we might be justified in simply ignoring it as 
irrelevant to the issue of use and enforcement.  However, I prefer to consider it as a 
type of nonuse.  I use the label “functional nonuse” because the use ends up—as a 
normative matter—being treated as nonuse for functional reasons.  
To take a silly example, no one would count the display of patent documents on 
a living room wall as a use for purposes of determining whether the patent owner is 
an IP user and can enforce its patent rights.  More realistically, firms sometimes 
obtain lots of patents in order to send a signal to investors that the firm has substantial 
knowledge capital, a particularly productive research and development department, 
or a willingness to invest heavily in inventive activity, or they use the description of 
the invention in the patent application to convey information about a particularly 
 
patents owned by different patentees, all of whom insist on royalties—a situation known as “royalty 
stacking”—the total burden on X can be huge.  See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).   
 27. Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2148–49, 2174–75; Tun-Jen Chiang, Trolls and 
Orphans, 96 B.U. L. REV. 691, 694–96 (2016).   
 28. See infra notes 52–57 (explaining patent law policies). 
 29. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).  In fact, much of the time, the 
patent has too small a market value to justify commercialization.  Id. at 627–28 (arguing that firms collect 
lots of patents, many of them low value, to credibly signal information to the capital markets).   
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promising research agenda.30  In these cases, the patentee uses the patent and the 
invention described in it for private benefit—to attract investment from the capital 
markets—but not in a way that fits the standard model of patent law, which assumes 
that patentees obtain profits from commercially exploiting their patented inventions 
and that those profits reward and thus incentivize inventive effort.31  Perhaps the 
standard model should be expanded to include these signaling uses, but if not, there 
is a mismatch between the use and the functions of patent law.  My general point 
here is that not all kinds of use should count.  The uses that matter ought to fit what 
the IP rights are trying to do. 
II. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF IP NONUSE 
The following discussion focuses on whether, in theory, nonuse should affect the 
existence and enforceability of IP rights.  The answer, as we shall see, depends on 
the normative theory justifying the grant of rights.  IP law in the United States draws 
on a number of different normative theories.  The dominant theory is utilitarian; it 
focuses on maximizing aggregate social welfare understood in economic terms.32  
But the precise content of the utilitarian theory is different for different areas of IP 
law.33  In addition, nonutilitarian theories focused on individual rights and fairness 
to creators (rather than aggregate welfare) compete for attention, more so in some IP 
areas than in others.34   
Section A below focuses on patent law; Section B on copyright law, and Section 
C on trademark law.  This discussion sets the stage for Part III’s analysis of PAEs, 
orphan works, and trademark abandonment. 
A.  PATENT 
1.  Background 
Empirical studies confirm that many, perhaps most, patents are unused.  One study 
estimated that “approximately forty to ninety percent of issued patents are not used 
or licensed by the patentees.”35  Patentees have many reasons for choosing not to use 
 
 30. Id. at 647–48, 651–52, 672–74.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, start-ups did a 
lot of patenting because venture capitalists treated the number of patents a start-up applied for and obtained 
as a signal that the start-up was well managed and that the entrepreneurs behind it had enough confidence 
in their venture to invest in obtaining patents.  Id. at 653. 
 31. Id. at 636–43 (contrasting the signaling model with the standard model of patent law).  
 32. See MERGES ET AL, supra note 6, at I-11; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) [hereinafter, Lemley, Economics of 
Improvement].  
 33. Compare infra sections II.A.2 and B.2 (patent and copyright) with II.C.2 (trademark).  
 34. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9-22 (Harv. Univ. Press, 2011) 
[hereinafter, R. MERGES, JUSTIFYING]; MERGES ET AL, supra note 6, at III-17, IV-11. 
 35. Saunders, supra note 25, at 391.  See also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1503–04 (2001) (presenting data showing that many patents are left 
unused after they are issued); Chavosh, supra note 8, at 3–4 (reporting a study in Europe showing that 
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their patents.  An invention might not have enough commercial or private value to 
make it worth using, or the patent might be part of a larger portfolio of patents that 
serves to fence off a core technology36 or signal firm strength.37  The patent might 
be stored away to use in a future litigation settlement or, as in the case of strategic 
nonuse, to assert against a third-party user.38 
The United States has never imposed a use requirement on domestic patent 
holders, although a few lower federal courts toyed with the idea in the late nineteenth 
century.39  The patent statute imposed a use (“working”) requirement on foreigners 
for a brief period in the first half of the nineteenth century.40  But this requirement 
was repealed in 1836, and the Patent Act has never had a formal use requirement 
since.41   
The Patent Act today does require patentees to pay periodic maintenance fees to 
keep their patents active.42  This requirement screens out patents that have too little 
value to the patent owner to justify paying even the relatively small fee, and it seems 
reasonable to suppose that most, if not all, of these patents are unused.43  However, 
maintenance fees are not the equivalent of a use requirement.  Indeed, nonusers who 
place a significant value on their unused patents, such as strategic nonusers and 
functional nonusers, have good reason to pay the required fees.44   
Today, many countries outside the U.S. require that patent owners use their 
patents.45  These working requirements take a number of forms and serve a number 
of different purposes, including teaching the art to the local population, disclosing 
the invention in the patent-granting country, promoting the local economy, and 
 
about 50% of all patents in the patent portfolios of some large companies, such as IBM, are not used 
internally, licensed, or sold to third parties). 
 36. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 37. Long, supra note 29.   
 38. Chavosh, supra note 8, at 3 (listing reasons). 
 39. See Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1886); Saunders, supra note 25, at 398–99 
(explaining that a few lower federal courts denied liability for infringement in some cases where the 
patentee did not work the patent).  The Supreme Court put an end to the practice in Cont’l Paper Bag Co. 
v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908), where it held that the patentee has an absolute 
property right to refrain from using its patent. 
 40. From 1832 to 1836, any foreigner who obtained a U.S. patent had to use—”work”—the patent 
in the United States or forfeit its U.S. patent rights.  See Trimble, supra note 2, at 488.  
 41. 6A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 25, §19.04[3][l].  Indeed, Section 271(d), adopted in 1988, 
provides that:  “No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement 
shall be denied relief . . . by reason of having . . . refused to license or use any rights to the patent.”  35 
U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).   
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (requiring payment of fees three-and-a half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-
and-a-half years after grant); see Lemley, supra note 35, at 1503.  
 43. Lemley, supra note 35, at 1503 (noting the large number of issued patents that lapse for failure 
to pay maintenance fees). 
 44. Presumably increasing the amount of the fee would screen more unused patents, but there is a 
limit to how high the fee can be set without adversely affecting users as well. 
 45. For an overview and a history, see Trimble, supra note 2, at 487–97.  There is uncertainty about 
whether the TRIPS agreement bars working requirements.  See id. at 496 (noting that some commentators 
believe that, while TRIPS does not do so expressly, it does so implicitly). 
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protecting local industry.46  As we shall see in Part III, use requirements have found 
a new purpose with the advent of PAEs—deterring patent trolls.  
2. Normative Analysis 
Whether some kind of use requirement is desirable today depends on the goals of 
patent law.  Perhaps more strongly than any other body of IP law in the United States, 
patent law rests on a utilitarian foundation.47  There are two competing utilitarian 
theories:  the prospect theory and the incentive theory.  
The prospect theory focuses on efficient commercialization.48  The idea is to give 
a property right to the inventor so the inventor can internalize all the benefits and 
costs of commercialization and coordinate an efficient scheme of use and licensing.49  
At first glance, it might seem obvious that prospect theory would support a use 
requirement.  After all, the theory justifies granting patent rights to promote efficient 
use.50  However, the idea behind prospect theory is to grant patents before plans to 
commercialize have crystallized.  Therefore, while prospect theory requires use at 
some point, it does not require use as a condition to obtaining a patent or as a 
requirement for enforcing the patent during the preparatory period.51 
Prospect theory need not detain us further because it is not the core policy 
justification for patent rights.  That honor belongs to the incentive theory.  Two 
incentives matter:  the incentive to invent and the incentive to disclose.52  Without IP 
rights, a prospective inventor cannot be confident that she can recoup the fixed costs 
she incurs during the invention process.  The reason has to do with the fact that 
information is a public good.53  In particular, information has the feature of 
 
 46. See id. at 497–501.  United States patent law addresses the teaching and disclosure goals by 
requiring disclosure in the patent application.  Id.  
 47. See, e.g., MERGES AT AL., supra note 6, at III-17; David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis 
for Patent Law Seriously:  The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 
182 (2009); see also Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property:  General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  It is worth 
mentioning, however, that some commentators have proposed nonutilitarian theories.  See, e.g., R. 
MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34, at 2–4.  Still, it is fair to say that utilitarianism, and in particular the 
economic strand of utilitarianism, dominates the patent law field.  
 48. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).  
 49. Id. at 276–79. 
 50. Id. at 266. 
 51. Although it might make sense within prospect theory to require a bona fide intent to use as a 
condition to obtaining a patent.  A useful analogy here is to the ITU registration scheme of the Lanham 
Trademark Act, in which a trademark owner can apply for registration before actually using the mark in 
commerce but must attest to a bona fide intent to use.  See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, 
§ 19:13. 
 52. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1017, 1024–30 (1989) (noting that the courts have relied mainly on these two incentives).  
 53. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 114 (6th ed. 2016); Lemley, 
Economics of Improvement, supra note 32, at 994–95; Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings 
of Patent Law, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 247 (1994). 
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nonexcludability.54  Suppose that in order to realize a revenue stream, our inventor 
must publicly disclose the invention by marketing it or otherwise using it in a public 
way.  When the inventor does so, others will copy the invention freely without having 
to invest in discovering it and thus be able to sell the same invention at a price lower 
than the inventor must charge to recoup its fixed invention costs.  This leaves the 
inventor suffering a net loss.  Anticipating this outcome, our prospective inventor, 
who is assumed to be rational and commercially motivated, will not bother to invent 
in the first place. 
Patent law solves this problem—and incentivizes invention—by giving the 
inventor a legal right to exclude the copier.  Armed with patent rights, the inventor 
can demand a license on threat of suit or simply enjoin the copier from using the 
invention.  Patent law also incentivizes public disclosure by requiring patent 
applicants to disclose their inventions.  Public disclosure stimulates further invention 
and helps to realize the value of inventions for the broader society. 
On the other side of the ledger, patent rights generate costs.  Because the patent 
owner has a monopoly over the invention, it can charge prices above the competitive 
level and this produces deadweight loss.55  Also, a patentee can prevent others from 
building on the patented invention to innovate further, which can chill follow-on 
creativity and impede downstream innovation when licensing fails.56  Finally, a 
patent system creates administrative, enforcement, and transaction costs, including 
the costs of managing the patent registry, litigating patent suits, and licensing patent 
rights.57   
From a utilitarian perspective, an optimal patent system balances the incentive 
and disclosure benefits of patent rights against the social costs.  The question for us 
is how, if at all, use and nonuse fit into this utilitarian balance.  At first glance, it 
might seem that use should always be a condition to enforcing a patent, and some 
commentators have suggested as much.  The utilitarian account, after all, focuses on 
social welfare, and use is essential to realizing the full social value of an invention.  
If a patent owner is not using the invention and a third party starts using it, the 
utilitarian rationale would seem to favor the third-party user.   
However, the status of nonuse in utilitarian theory is more complicated.  It 
depends on the particular type of nonuse.  The following analysis considers complete 
 
 54. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 53, at 114.   
 55. See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency:  Consequence-Sensitive Theories of 
Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 238–39 (2014); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 
32, at 996. 
 56. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:  Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991); Brett. M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 257 (2007). 
 57. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW, 18–19 (Harv. Univ. Press, 2003).  These are not the only costs of the patent system.  For 
example, patent races produce duplicative research and can even dissipate the social benefits of the patent 
monopoly, and the prospect of a patent monopoly can draw investment away from lines of socially useful 
research that are not likely to generate patentable inventions.   
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nonuse, temporary nonuse, and functional nonuse.  I discuss strategic nonuse in 
connection with the analysis of PAEs in Part III.58 
a.  Complete Nonuse 
Suppose X invents a new gadget, obtains a patent on it, and then shelves it, 
convinced that it is not worth commercializing or otherwise using.  Or suppose X 
sells the invention and then puts it aside before the end of the patent term, after 
demand for it declines or a new technology supersedes it.  When X completely ceases 
using the invention, a third party, Y, discovers a new use for it.  The question is 
whether X, a complete nonuser, should be able to enforce its patent rights against Y, 
a productive user. 
The utilitarian answer may seem obvious:  Y should be allowed to use the 
invention freely.59  Y adds social value by its use, and X loses nothing because X is 
doing nothing with the invention.  However, it is also important to consider how a 
rule of no enforcement might affect X’s incentives at earlier stages of the process.  
Two stages are salient:  the invention stage and the commercialization stage. 
Any negative effects at the invention stage are likely to be trivial.60  To be sure, X 
might invest less in invention ex ante when it knows it will not be able to capture all 
the additional benefits if it stops using the invention before the end of the patent term 
and a third party, like Y, discovers a new and valuable use for it.  However, this factor 
is not likely to affect X’s investment incentives in a substantial way.  Although it is 
an empirical question how often patentees completely cease using inventions during 
the patent term only to have a third party discover a new use with substantial value, 
it would be surprising if this were a common occurrence.  Indeed, X has good reason 
to believe that most uses by third parties under these circumstances will not be all 
that valuable.  After all, a rational and economically motivated X will have 
considered all potentially lucrative uses before it stops using the invention, including 
uses that others might find valuable and that X can license.61  To be sure, new 
technological developments might open up new possibilities for the invention after 
X has put the invention aside.  But a firm deciding ex ante how much to invest in a 
research project will have great difficulty foreseeing the existence of new 
technologies in advance, so its incentives will not be affected much by the prospect.62   
 
 58. See infra section III.A.3. 
 59. In fact, as a practical matter, patentees in X’s position, convinced that the invention has little 
value, are not likely to pay the maintenance fees necessary to keep the patent from lapsing.  See supra 
notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
 60. The incentive analysis presented here is very similar to the incentive analysis for orphan works 
in Section III.B., and there I develop it in somewhat greater detail.  See infra notes 213–226 and 
accompanying text.  
 61. Indeed, any use by a third party must hew quite close to the actual invention in order to infringe, 
which makes it even more likely that a patentee will think of the use.  More precisely, for a use to infringe 
a patent, it must include all the elements of at least one claim, literally or by equivalents.  5A CHISUM ON 
PATENTS, supra note 25, §§ 18.03[4][a], 18.04.  
 62. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 57, at 213 (explaining that 
incentives cannot be significantly affected by the prospect of future technological developments that are 
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We must also consider the effects of a no-enforcement rule at the 
commercialization stage.  One might worry that a potential licensee would just refuse 
to license and wait until X puts the invention aside and completely ceases using it, at 
which point X would be a complete nonuser and the potential licensee could use the 
invention freely under a no enforcement rule.  For this strategy to be successful, 
however, all potential licensees must be willing to wait.  But the advantages of 
defecting and taking a license are just too great.63  A potential licensee who defects 
can start making profits as soon as it executes a license.  This is likely to be a 
substantial benefit, especially when the patentee has the ability to prolong the waiting 
period by continuing to seek out a licensee.  Also, if the license is exclusive, the firm 
that first takes a license will enjoy the market power that an exclusive license confers.   
Given the social benefits of incentivizing third parties, like Y, to develop socially 
valuable new uses and the minimal impact on patentee incentives, the utilitarian 
rationale strongly weighs in favor of allowing third parties to use a patented invention 
after the patentee abandons it.  One might consider conditioning third-party use on 
the user paying compensation to the patentee.  But even this much is hard to justify 
on utilitarian grounds.  Imposing a compensation requirement adds social costs—the 
costs of administering and enforcing the payment scheme and the costs of chilling 
innovation by third parties who cannot pay.64  And it is not likely to add much to 
invention incentives for the reasons discussed above. 
One special case of complete nonuse deserves separate mention.65  Firms 
sometimes collect numerous peripheral patents into large patent portfolios and use 
them to fence off a core patented technology.66  The idea is to make it difficult for 
others to come even close to the core technology and thus to enlarge the penumbra 
of protection for it.67  In these cases, the firm makes no actual use of the peripheral 
patents except as litigation threats or settlement bargaining chips, neither of which 
qualifies as use under my definition.68  Allowing enforcement of all the patents in 
such a portfolio, including unused peripheral patents, can enhance incentives to 
 
not reasonably foreseeable at the time the invention is made).  And X will discount any future revenue 
stream to present value, which will reduce the incentive impact even further.  Id. at 213.  
 63. This scenario is a Prisoners’ Dilemma and the incentives to defect in Prisoners’ Dilemma games 
are well known.  ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY, 
19–21 (4th ed. 2007). 
 64. See William M. Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 
325, 358 (1989) (noting that compulsory licensing schemes are “likely to entail substantial costs”). 
 65. Another special case of complete nonuse involves technology suppression.  See supra note 25.  
This often occurs when a patentee finds it more profitable to continue selling products that embody an old 
technology rather than switch to the new technology.  It uses its patent to prevent competitors from 
competing with the new technology.  See Saunders, supra note 25, at 392-96.  This is an easy case for 
barring protection.  The purpose of the strategy is anti-competitive and its effects are clearly welfare-
reducing.   
 66. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 36, at 31–41. 
 67. Id. at 32–33. 
 68. Id. at 36.  Litigation threats and settlement bargaining chips do not constitute use because they 
only involve the assertion of patent rights. 
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invent by helping firms manage risk and avoid costly litigation.69  But it can also 
increase social costs by creating a kind of “super-patent” that expands the patent 
owner’s monopoly well beyond what is socially desirable and beyond what the patent 
law contemplates.70  Many commentators believe that the risks and costs of an 
expanded monopoly exceed any incentive benefits.71  If so, allowing enforcement of 
unused peripheral patents in these cases makes no sense.72 
b. Temporary Nonuse 
It is easy to see that patentees should be allowed to enforce their patents during 
periods of temporary nonuse.  Suppose our firm X believes that its new invention has 
commercial value but lacks the resources to commercialize it.  X seeks a licensee.  
Under these circumstances, X should be allowed to enforce its patent while it 
searches, even though X is not using the invention during the search period.  If X 
could not stop third parties, potential licensees would have no incentive to enter into 
licensing agreements.  They would just use the invention, confident that X, as a 
temporary nonuser, could not enforce its patent rights against them.   
This scenario is different than the one discussed above for complete nonuse, since 
here potential licensees could use the invention immediately without waiting for the 
patentee to become a complete nonuser.73  And if prospective inventors anticipate 
this possibility, they will be less inclined to invent when they cannot commercialize 
inventions themselves.74  As a result, one would expect inventive activity to become 
more concentrated in larger firms that can commercialize inventions on their own, 
 
 69. Id. at 32–34 (explaining how patent portfolios confer scale and diversity advantages). 
 70. Id. at 38.  In these cases, the firm usually has a patent on the core technology (which would be 
enforceable because the technology is in use) and relies on the unused peripheral patents to deter others 
from getting anywhere near that technology.  Clark D. Asay, Patenting Elasticities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2017).  Since the patent on the core technology is supposed to balance incentive benefits and monopoly 
costs optimally, it follows that allowing enforcement of the unused peripheral patents can only distort the 
balance by expanding the monopoly and increasing monopoly costs. 
 71. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 36, at 66–67 (discussing the monopoly costs); Asay, 
supra note 70, at 11–12 (counting firms’ patenting of peripheral technologies to protect a central patent 
as among the patent system’s costs).  Not all of the peripheral patents are necessarily unused, as I define 
nonuse, and those in use would qualify for enforcement.   
 72. A more complete analysis of this topic would have to define peripheral and nonperipheral 
patents for different types of patent families and also consider the status of unused claims within a single 
patent. 
 73. Even if we allowed the patent owner to enforce its patent rights after it negotiated a license—
so third parties would use the invention at the risk of being enjoined later—potential licensees might still 
refuse to license since they know they can benefit immediately from use.  
 74. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1783–86 (2007); Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 1480–81.  
Alternatively, they might try to keep the invention secret and rely on trade secret law while they look for 
a licensee, but this strategy has serious problems.  For one thing, keeping information secret is not easy to 
do.  Moreover, a secrecy strategy undermines the public disclosure goals of patent law.  And secrecy 
makes licensing difficult.  See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:  Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 264–81 (1998) (arguing that the social costs of trade secret law might  
outweigh the benefits).  
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which could depress the overall rate of innovation if, as some claim, small inventors 
are responsible for a lot of inventive activity.75   
Moreover, in a world where inventors cannot enforce their patents during periods 
of temporary nonuse, even a large firm would face risks that a competitor might beat 
it to the market and make substantial sales while the firm works on commercializing 
its invention.  Anticipating this, large firms will be inclined to invest less in research 
or shorten the period of preparation for commercialization, thereby depriving the 
public of a better commercial product or a more efficient marketing scheme. 
c.  Functional Nonuse   
So far, we have seen that a patent owner should be barred from enforcing its patent 
in cases of complete nonuse but not in cases of temporary nonuse.  Functional nonuse 
is more difficult to assess.  Recall that in cases of functional nonuse, the patentee 
uses the patent, but not in a way that fits the standard patent model.76  For example, 
X might obtain lots of patents to assemble them into a patent portfolio that signals 
the capital markets that the firm is strong and has a strong research program.  Suppose 
another firm, Y, discovers a way to use one of the patented inventions productively.77  
Should X be allowed to enforce its patent rights against Y?78 
One can argue for a negative answer on the ground that signaling does not fit 
patent law and that creating signaling benefits is not what patent law is supposed to 
do.79  However, the social benefits from X’s signaling strategy might exceed the 
social costs even if those benefits do not fit the standard account of patent law.80  
Still, it is not clear what patent enforcement has to do with a signaling strategy.  After 
all, the signal stems from the patent grant itself, not from the assertion of patent 
rights.  But if enforcement does promote signaling in some way and if the benefits 
of signaling exceed the costs, then perhaps the standard account of patent law should 
be expanded to include signaling benefits (thereby turning signaling from a 
functional nonuse into a qualifying use).   
My point is only that, assuming patent enforcement is important to functional 
nonuse, the costs and benefits of denying enforcement for this type of nonuse are 
 
 75. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act 
and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 518–19, 562 (2013) (noting the difficulty of determining 
how important small inventors are to the pace of innovation). 
 76. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 77. Y’s use would have to include all the elements or equivalents for at least one of X’s patent 
claims.  5A CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 25, §§ 18.03[4][a], 18.04. 
 78. It is possible that X would not care enough to bother enforcing its rights.  Maybe it can obtain 
all the signaling benefits it wants even with Y using the invention.  However, X might worry that Y’s use 
will improve Y’s market position relative to X, or that its use will introduce noise into X’s patent signal.  
Or X might just want the extra revenue from licensing Y. 
 79. This argument can rely, for example, on an assumption of institutional specialization, that 
different bodies of law serve different purposes and that there are likely to be long-term costs from forcing 
patent law to do things it was not meant to do. 
 80. Those benefits include lower information and search costs and maybe even enhanced invention 
incentives from cheaper access to capital markets. 
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likely to vary significantly across different cases.81  This sensitivity to factual context 
makes it difficult to adopt a general rule of no enforcement like the one applied to 
complete nonuse cases, or a general rule of universal enforcement like the one 
applied to temporary nonuse cases.  Allowing enforcement with functional nonuse 
might be a good idea in some cases but not in others.   
B.  COPYRIGHT 
1. Background 
The total number of unused copyrighted works is almost certainly very large, 
especially when one counts works with unregistered as well as registered copyrights.  
Indeed, historical copyright renewal data compiled for the period when U.S. 
copyright owners had to renew their copyrights suggest that even registered works 
might have a high incidence of nonuse.82  One study has found that “fewer than 11 
percent of the copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end 
of their twenty-eight year term.”83  This very low renewal rate suggests a low use 
rate, at least on the assumption that copyright owners would renew if they were still 
using their works.84    
Another source of evidence for widespread nonuse in general can be found in the 
prevalence of orphan works.85  Orphan works are works for which the current 
copyright owner cannot be identified with reasonable effort, such as out-of-print 
books, old photographs still under copyright, unpublished papers, letters, and the 
like.86  Although it is possible for an orphan work to still be in use, it is much more 
likely that orphan works are unused, maybe even forgotten.87  Given this, the number 
of orphan works is some indication of the number of unused works.  And the number 
 
 81. See Long, supra note 29, at 675–78 (detailing a complex set of potential costs and benefits that 
vary with context). 
 82. Before the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright owners had to renew their copyrights after the first 
twenty-eight years.  Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §9.01 (2018).  
 83. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
471, 473 (2003).  See also id. at 498-513.  
 84. One must be careful, however, about drawing inferences of use from renewal rates.  A copyright 
owner who uses her work might have been unaware of the renewal requirement.  Also, a copyright owner 
who does not bother to renew may still value her work for private use.  However, an owner who cares 
about her work enough to use it privately would probably be inclined to renew in order to control use by 
others—again, assuming she is aware of the renewal requirement. 
 85. I discuss orphan works in some detail in Part III below.  Here I use them only for information 
about the extent of copyright nonuse. 
 86. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1396–98 (2012) (describing orphan works as “economically abandoned” and 
“left . . . to languish” by their owners).  For a work to qualify as an orphan, it must be impossible to find 
the copyright owner with reasonable effort.  This is less likely to be true for works still in use.  When a 
work is being used, it should be possible much of the time to locate the copyright owner simply by 
identifying the current user (maybe with a web search) and then, if the current user is not the copyright 
owner, tracing ownership back to the copyright owner.  
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of orphan works is very large.  Empirical studies of library collections “estimate that 
anywhere from 17% to 25% of the works in the core, published collection of books, 
and up to 70% in more specialized collections, could be considered orphan works,” 
and the proportions are even higher for unpublished works, such as letters, diaries, 
and the like.88   
Despite the prevalence of unused copyrights, United States copyright law has 
never required use as a condition for enforcing rights.  It grants the same rights to 
unused works as to works that are used.  In fact, copyright law even extends the 
favorable treatment accorded unpublished works to those that are unused.  Before 
the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act—when publication was required for federal 
rights—unpublished works, including those not used, were protected by state 
common law copyright, and common law copyright in some respects afforded 
broader protection than federal law.89  Today, unpublished works fall under federal 
copyright, but they still receive favorable treatment in a number of ways.90  Thus, to 
the extent unused works are also unpublished—and the overlap between the two 
categories is probably large—unused works receive favorable treatment, too. 
2. Normative Analysis 
The case for protecting unused IP is stronger in copyright than it is in patent, and 
the reason has to do with differences at the policy level.  Patent law, as we saw, is 
based primarily on a utilitarian theory that focuses on incentives to create and 
disclose.  Although incentive-based utilitarian theory is a major driver of copyright 
law, nonutilitarian theories are also quite influential.  For example, the Supreme 
Court relied on both utilitarian and nonutilitarian theories to justify a narrower fair 
use privilege for unpublished works.91  The following discussion considers nonuse 
 
 88. David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 1, 8–9 (2013) [hereinafter Hansen et al., Orphan Works]. 
 89. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 82, § 8C.02 (“Although rights under common law 
copyright have counterparts under statutory copyright, it may be that the common law rights themselves 
are in some ways broader than their federal analogues.”).  For example, common law copyright lasted 
indefinitely while federal copyright lasted for only a limited term. Id. vol. 3 at § 9.09.  
 90. For example, the scope of the fair use defense is narrower for unpublished works.  Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554, 564 (1985); 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 82, § 13.05[2][b](iii) (noting that the unpublished nature of a work still weighs against fair use even 
after the amendment to § 107, although how much is unclear).  It is also worth noting that the mandatory 
deposit requirement does not apply to unpublished works, 17 U.S.C. § 407, and a failure to affix notice 
does not limit damages, as it does for published works, 17 U.S.C. § 405(b). 
 91. In particular, the Court reasoned that weakening fair use and thus strengthening the right of first 
publication allowed the author to maximize economic return and also to protect her noneconomic interest 
in creative control and privacy.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555 (“The author’s control of first public 
distribution implicates not only his personal interest in creative control but his property interest in 
exploitation of prepublication rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable adjunct to 
publicity and marketing.”).  But see Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
“the protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law” and that “copyright law offers a limited 
monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to the creative work of the author”) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis in the original).   
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in copyright, first under a utilitarian theory, and then under the two main 
nonutilitarian theories:  Lockean labor-desert and personhood. 
a.  Utilitarian Theory 
Although the utilitarian analysis developed for patent law applies to copyright as 
well, there are some differences.  For one, the chilling effect of copyright on 
downstream creativity is less severe because copyright protects only against copying 
while patent also prevents independent replication.92  Furthermore, copyright prizes 
works in part for their intrinsic value as embodying the creator’s personal expressive 
vision.93  This intrinsic value benefits the creator at the same time as it enhances 
social welfare.  One might say the same thing for inventions: the satisfaction 
experienced by an inventor in successfully inventing adds an increment to social 
welfare.  However, the instrumental value of inventions is paramount in patent law; 
useful inventions are valuable because of the knowledge they provide or the practical 
work they do.94   
Still, it is clear that a blanket use requirement is not a good idea on utilitarian 
grounds for the same reasons it was not a good idea in patent law.  Namely, it impedes 
effective licensing and depresses incentives to create.95  Moreover, the implications 
for the different types of nonuse are roughly the same.  I explore complete nonuse 
more carefully in my discussion of orphan works in Part III, but the conclusion on 
utilitarian grounds is the same as for patent: a utilitarian analysis supports barring 
enforcement of copyright rights for completely unused works.96  Enforcement should 
not be barred for temporary nonuse; otherwise, licensing markets would be impaired, 
just as for patent.97  As for functional nonuse, real world examples are much harder 
to find in copyright than in patent because copyright credits a much wider range of 
uses, including private as well as public uses, uses with intrinsic value, and uses with 
instrumental value.  However, for cases of functional nonuse, the conclusion is likely 
to be the same as it was for patent: the implications of functional nonuse for 
enforcement are likely to vary with the type of case. 
 
 92. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 32, at 1014.   
 93. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“Personality always 
contains something unique.  It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of 
art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.  That something he may copyright unless 
there is a restriction in the words of the act.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 341–42 
(1988). 
 95. It should not matter that copyright requires actual copying for infringement, whereas patent 
protects even against independent replication.  From a utilitarian perspective, the focus is on incentives to 
create and it is the prospect of realizing value associated with use that normally motivates creation in the 
first place.   
 96. See infra notes 214–227 and accompanying text.  
 97. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
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Strategic nonuse is possible, but it takes a somewhat different form than in 
patent.98  Part of what makes the holdup strategy so effective in patent law is the 
element of surprise, and surprise is facilitated by the rule that independent inventors, 
not just copiers, are liable for infringement.99  Surprise is much more difficult for a 
copyright owner to achieve because copyright law requires copying and copiers 
usually know what they are copying.100  To be surprised in these cases, a user must 
mistakenly believe that the work is out of copyright or that the owner will not sue.   
b. Lockean Theory 
There is, however, more at stake for copyright than utilitarian incentives, and the 
nonutilitarian theories push more strongly toward protecting unused works.  I discuss 
Lockean natural rights theory in this section and personhood theory in the next. 
The standard account of Lockean theory supposes, roughly speaking, that 
individuals obtain property rights by mixing their labor with the things of the 
world.101  For example, an apple picker uses her labor to pick apples and thereby 
mixes her labor with the apples she picks.  As a result, she secures a natural right to 
those apples as her property.  So too, IP theorists argue, a creator or inventor applies 
intellectual labor when she creates something new and as a result has a natural 
property right to her creation and can exclude others from it.102 
At first glance, it might seem obvious that IP rights based on Lockean theory 
would not require use.  The creator’s natural right, after all, depends only on the act 
of mixing labor, and not on what the creator does or does not do with what she 
creates.  However, the analysis is not quite so simple.  Locke recognized limits to the 
 
 98. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
723, 732 (2013).  Professor Balganesh argues that the copyright troll problem has less to do with holdup 
and more to do with excessive enforcement that disrupts an under-enforcement equilibrium critical to 
copyright law.  Id. at 746–47.  He describes copyright trolls that obtain narrowly tailored interests in 
copyrights for the sole purpose of suing and monitor aggressively for specific instances of infringement.  
Id. at 732, 738–39.  Balganesh’s main example is a troll that files numerous lawsuits against small-scale 
infringers, often involving web postings, and exploits the threat of statutory damages to obtain small 
settlements.  Id. at 739–41.  Although this business model does not depend on holdup, it does involve 
strategic nonuse, and the nonuse aspect creates problems because it allows these trolls to focus more 
efficiently and aggressively on the task of enforcing copyright rights.   
 99. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 32, at 1014 (noting that a user can be liable 
for patent infringement without copying the invention and without even knowing the patented invention 
exists).  Almost all of the patent suits in the software industry, where PAEs dominate, are against 
independent inventors, not copiers.  Lemley & Melamed, supra note 15, at 2148–49 (reporting that more 
than 97% are filed against independent inventors).   
 100. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 82, § 13.01[B].   
 101. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 133–35 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner 
Publishing Co. 1947)(1690).  There is some dispute about the best interpretation of Locke’s theory, which 
is why I refer to the “standard account.” 
 102. See, e.g., R. MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 
(1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Property Right]. 
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natural rights he proposed, some of which take account of harm to others.103  When 
an IP owner chooses not to use her IP, her choice can harm others by chilling their 
creativity and denying them access for their own creative purposes.  
To see this point more clearly, consider the following hypothetical.  Suppose that 
John composes a piece of jazz music and shelves it, choosing not to publish or 
otherwise use it.  Mary is also a jazz composer and creates a similar piece of music.  
As long as Mary works independently without copying John, she will not infringe 
John’s copyright and can even obtain a copyright of her own.104  However, Mary still 
faces risks.  For one thing, if the two compositions are similar enough, John might 
assume that Mary somehow copied his work and file an infringement suit.  This is 
not a far-fetched scenario in the world of music where, because of the limited number 
of musical forms, independent creation can produce similar compositions.105  If John 
sues Mary, she will have to pay litigation costs to defend the suit,106 and given the 
inevitable risk of error, she will also face a chance of being held liable.107  The fact 
that John chooses not to use his work increases these risks for Mary.  John’s nonuse 
keeps Mary in the dark about the content of John’s composition, and thus makes it 
difficult for her to predict whether John will sue and whether it makes sense to seek 
a license.108  These costs and risks can chill Mary from creating in the first place.   
Locke did not focus specifically on IP, of course, but he did worry about the harms 
that might result from recognizing natural rights too broadly.  His concerns led him 
to impose two conditions on the natural right:  that the right holder not waste his 
property (the spoilage proviso), and perhaps most famously that there be “enough 
and as good left in common for others” (the so-called sufficiency proviso).109  Much 
 
 103. See Gordon, Property Right, supra note 102, at 1544–45, 1558–59, 1561, 1564 (arguing that 
Locke’s theory is based on a no-harm principle, which demands that natural right holders not unjustifiably 
harm others). 
 104. This is perfectly consistent with Lockean theory.  By working independently, Mary does not 
take anything from John, and by mixing her own labor with the things of the world, she obtains a natural 
right to her creation. 
 105. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903–04 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining the need for courts 
analyzing “striking similarity” to consider the likelihood that the similar work was produced 
coincidentally or independently). 
 106. In the United States, parties usually pay their own attorneys, win or lose.  The Copyright Act 
creates an exception that allows the winning party to collect fees from the loser, but the exception is 
discretionary with the judge.  17 U.S.C. § 505 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).  
 107. To be sure, John would probably have to prove that Mary had access to his work, which is 
likely be very difficult if he keeps the work to himself.  Still, if the two works are similar enough, a jury 
might mistakenly infer copying from the similarity.  See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 
82, §§ 13.02-13.03 (explaining the relationship among access, similarity, and infringement). 
 108. In general, use helps give notice.  For example, it signals others that the user claims the property 
and delineates its boundaries.  See Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 1477, 1480–81 (discussing notice 
and informational benefits of use in the patent context).  This is certainly true for public use.  If Mary 
observes that John uses his composition actively, she knows to get a license or avoid copying the 
expression.  Even if John uses only privately, Mary can infer from knowledge that John is engaged in use 
that John cares about the music, and this gives her at least an opportunity to determine whether further 
inquiry is worthwhile. 
 109. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 101, bk. II, § 27 (stating the “enough and as good” 
proviso), §§ 37–38 (stating the no waste obligation).  Locke also imposed a charity obligation that requires 
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has been written about whether these two provisos fit a deontological theory, or 
whether they—and especially the sufficiency proviso—inject consequentialist 
elements and ultimately a utilitarian strand.110  We need not dwell on this debate.  
Either way, one thing is clear:  there must be limits to the Lockean natural rights that 
attach to creations so that the intellectual commons can be nurtured and others can 
have comparable opportunities to create.111  The question is whether some kind of 
use requirement should be one of those limits.  
The answer to that question is yes.  Use is relevant to the spoilage proviso and 
also, in a more limited way, to the sufficiency proviso.  Consider the spoilage 
proviso.  Locke believed that allowing one’s property to spoil offended natural law 
and therefore a laborer “had no Right, farther than his Use.”112  The problem with 
applying this proviso to IP is that IP is not obviously prone to spoilage in the same 
way as the fruit and acorns that Locke wrote about.  A novel, musical composition, 
or invention remains intact over time.  Nevertheless, as several commentators have 
pointed out, it is possible to construe spoilage more broadly in the IP field to 
encompass negative effects on an IP asset’s value.113  Understood in this way, the 
spoilage proviso would apply to deny a natural right to the IP owner when its nonuse 
dissipates the value of the IP.   
This understanding of spoilage would seem to rule out Lockean rights for 
complete nonuse, which involves shelving IP and not using it at all.114  This kind of 
nonuse dissipates the IP’s value by completely ignoring opportunities to realize and 
develop it.  Still, tricky problems can arise when an owner stops using IP only after 
it has lost its value.  I address these problems in connection with my discussion of 
orphan works in Part III.  There, I argue that the nonuse of orphan works implicates 
the spoilage proviso when the copyright owner ignores the possibility of new 
technological uses and thus wastes the potential of adding new value to the work.115 
Now consider the sufficiency proviso.  Nonuse can trigger Locke’s sufficiency 
proviso when it denies access in a way that makes other creators worse off.  The 
problem is that it is difficult to see how other creators can be worse off when they 
have access to the same body of creative material as the original author.116  Professor 
Gordon has responded to this problem by arguing that some creations, when made 
public, change the cultural landscape so profoundly that withdrawing them from 
 
a property owner under some circumstances to share his property with those in extreme need.  See LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES, supra 101, bk. I, § 42.   
 110. See, e.g., Gordon, Property Right, supra note 102, at 1544–45.  There are also debates about 
the relationship between the two provisos.   
 111. Gordon, Property Right, supra note 102, at 1556–57.  
 112. LOCKE, supra note 101, bk. II, § 37. 
 113. See R. MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34, at 56–61 (discussing applications of the spoilage 
proviso to IP). 
 114. Id. at 58 (noting that “[f]or Lockean waste to occur, the concept, idea, or other original creation 
that is embodied in these copies would have to spoil completely.  Its creator would have to elect to put 
it—the idea itself—on the shelf forever and make no use of it whatsoever.”).   
 115. See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text.  
 116. See Gordon, Property Right, supra note 102, at 1566–67. 
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public access after a period of use leaves other creators worse off than they were 
before the creation came into existence, and thus does not leave “enough and as 
good” for others.117  Whatever one may think of this argument, one thing is clear:  it 
has limited implications for nonuse because it focuses only on those works that have 
a profound impact on culture, and few copyrighted works have this kind of cultural 
impact.118  
There are, however, other ways to justify limits on rights.119  One involves 
locating limits in the conditions that make a mutually advantageous social practice 
possible.  The general idea is that all those who participate in and benefit from an 
ongoing practice have reason to accept the limits that make the practice work well 
for everyone.  One way to implement this idea is through contractarian theory.120  
The contractarian argument imagines a hypothetical bargaining situation in which 
participants choose principles and rules behind a “veil of ignorance,” knowing that 
whatever they choose will govern their interactions in the real world when the veil is 
lifted.121  For a proponent of contractarianism, the rules and principles unanimously 
chosen behind the veil have moral force binding participants in the real world. 
 
 117. Id. at 1565–72.  J.D. Salinger’s letters might be an example.  Between 1939 and 1961, Salinger 
wrote letters to a number of individuals, and some of the recipients donated the letters to various libraries 
where they were available for viewing but not for copying.  See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 
90, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1987).  When Ian Hamilton paraphrased the letters in an unauthorized biography, 
Salinger, who wanted his letters to remain private and unused, brought a copyright infringement suit to 
enjoin Hamilton’s use.  Id.  Allowing Salinger to prevent use of these letters in a biography, as the Second 
Circuit did, might offend the sufficiency proviso, given that Salinger is a public figure, his published 
writings have altered the cultural landscape, and the letters are important to a literary biography.  See 
Gordon, Property Right, supra note 102, at 1592–95. 
 118. Professor Merges accepts Gordon’s insight but argues that it is limited to “only a handful of 
works,” those that have profound effects on popular culture.  R. MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34, at 
52–55. 
 119. Professors Liivak and Penalver argue that a property theory based on individual autonomy and 
liberty, like Locke’s, requires a deliberate decision not to use property before nonuse can be protected by 
a Lockean right.  See Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 1466.  On this view, casual nonuse that does 
not involve rational deliberation is not an exercise of autonomy and therefore deserves no protection from 
Lockean rights.  However, it is not clear to me that this limitation follows from Lockean theory, which, 
after all, focuses on the act of appropriation.  
 120. Another possible way is through the idea of reciprocity-based fairness.  Reciprocity-based 
fairness dispenses with the idealized bargaining process.  Roughly, this view holds that it is fair to impose 
obligations on someone who voluntarily takes part in an institution or practice when that person benefits 
from others assuming the same obligations toward her and the institution or practice works better as a 
whole with the system of mutual obligation.  See generally Allan Gibbard, Constructing Justice, 20 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 264, 266-73 (Summer 1991) (describing Justice as Fair Reciprocity and contrasting it with 
Justice as Mutual Advantage and Justice as Impartiality). 
 121. Many people are familiar with these ideas, and especially with the “original position,” and the 
“veil of ignorance,” through John Rawls’s monumental work, A Theory of Justice.  JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  Contractarian arguments are relatively common in legal scholarship, and 
some legal scholars have used them to justify legal rules and principles in the IP field.  See, e.g., KIM 
LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS:  EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988) (using 
contractarianism to justify trade secrecy rules).  One must be careful, however, to distinguish ideal from 
egoistic contractarian arguments; only the former have moral force.  See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair 
Process:  The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 518-
19 (2003). 
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This is not the place to delve into contractarian theory in depth.  What is important 
to see is that this theory generates moral principles that can supply grounds for 
shaping moral rights.122  The key to applying the theory to IP is to recognize that 
creation is a socially contextualized activity.  Authors build on previous works when 
they create their own, and this process of mutual borrowing is essential to the efficacy 
of the creative enterprise as a whole.123  It would be difficult to sustain a vibrant 
practice of creative authorship under a system of broad Lockean rights without 
building in limitations that allow some reciprocal copying.   
This insight provides the basis for constructing a contractarian justification for 
limits that allow copying.  It does not take a rigorous formulation of the idealized 
bargaining situation to see that agents behind the veil, who are aware they are 
choosing norms to govern authorship within a property rights system, would choose 
limits that allow some amount of free copying.124  To be sure, by agreeing to allow 
copying, they put themselves at risk of having their own works copied without 
compensation, but in return they gain the ability to freely copy the works of others.125 
The question is whether contractarianism has anything to say about nonuse.  I 
believe the answer is yes.  Suppose A is a complete nonuser who ignores her work.  
If B is allowed to freely use A’s work, A suffers no economic harm (relative to how 
she would fare without the use) and B benefits by being able to use A’s work in 
creating his own.  Without developing the details of the original position and 
hypothetical bargaining, it seems evident that agents bargaining behind the veil, who 
know they could be either A or B in this scenario, would readily agree to a principle 
that allows free use.  Each bargaining agent knows that if she turns out to be an owner 
(A), she will not be able to prevent the use or be compensated for it.  But as an owner 
who is also a complete nonuser, she will be unlikely to care much about use.  On the 
other hand, she knows that if she turns out to be a prospective user (B), she will 
presumably care a lot about her desired use, and a principle that allows free use will 
serve her creative interests well.  
The principle of free use that emerges from hypothetical bargaining is likely to 
have some exceptions that allow owners to enjoin uses that seriously impair the 
owner’s creative interests.  For example, agents behind the veil, aware they are 
bargaining for principles to govern the practice of creative authorship, might well 
 
 122. Although there are different views about why contractarian principles have moral force, many 
commentators trace the source of moral authority to the way the ideal bargaining situation combines values 
of autonomy, consent, rationality, equality, impartiality, and mutual benefit.  See Bone, supra note 121, 
at 531-33.  
 123. Gordon, Property Right, supra note 102, at 1556–58. 
 124. Here I assume that property rights are given and agents bargain over limits.  One might instead 
allow for bargaining over the whole domain of possible rules and principles governing IP.   
 125. This reciprocity of benefit and burden also provides the basis for an argument from reciprocity-
based fairness.  See supra note 120.  Since some amount of reciprocal copying is necessary to support a 
vibrant practice of authorship, the argument goes, it is fair to impose an obligation on an author to allow 
some copying when other authors share the same obligation and the reciprocity of benefit and burden 
makes the practice of authorship work well for all.   
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recognize exceptions for uses that do violence to the integrity of the work or 
otherwise seriously affect the personhood interests of authors.126   
In sum, bargaining agents behind the veil are likely to adopt a principle of free 
use applicable to instances of complete nonuse, with possible exceptions for uses that 
seriously harm the original author’s creative interests.  Of course, an owner is 
perfectly free to choose not to use her work.  However, under the principle of free 
use, she cannot stop other authors from using her work when she is a complete 
nonuser, unless the use fits within an exception.  In Part III below, I explore the 
implications of this principle for orphan works and argue that it justifies limiting 
Lockean rights.  
I should be clear that I am not arguing that contractarianism is necessarily implicit 
in Lockean theory—although it is worth noting that Locke invoked the idea of tacit 
consent based on a social practice when he relied on the introduction of money to 
justify social inequality.127  My point is that principles derived from social practice 
through contractarianism have the kind of moral force capable of justifying limits to 
moral rights.128  
In sum, the Lockean argument, despite its focus on natural rights, can 
accommodate limits on IP rights when IP is not used.  These limits derive from a 
proper understanding of the spoilage proviso and, to a more limited extent, from the 
sufficiency proviso broadly construed. Moreover, it is also possible to justify limits 
on contractarian grounds.  Finally, although in theory social costs are not supposed 
to limit natural rights directly because natural rights constrain utilitarian goals, in 
practice social costs must impose limits when those costs are substantial enough.  In 
Part III, I argue that limits based on high social costs might be important for some 
uses of orphan works.129   
c. Personhood Theory 
Roughly speaking, a personhood theory focuses on protecting the highly personal 
connection between creator and creation.130  Typically, this theory begins with 
assumptions about a person’s need to exercise her will in the world, and then assumes 
that the expression of will forges a kind of constitutive connection between person 
and object.  A painting, for example, is the projection of the painter’s creative 
 
 126. For a discussion of personhood theory, see infra notes 130–142 and accompanying text. 
 127. LOCKE, supra note 101, bk. II, § 50.  Briefly, Locke argued that people tacitly consented to the 
institution of money by using it as a medium of exchange and that the use of money made it possible for 
some to acquire much more than others without violating the spoilage and sufficiency provisos.  See A. 
JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 290, 298-306 (1992). 
 128. A contractarian approach, with its reliance on values of autonomy, individual rationality, and 
consent, might fit Lockean rights closely enough to justify limits within Lockean theory, but even if not, 
it has the moral force to justify limits independently. 
 129. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 130. Personhood theory comes in somewhat different, though overlapping, forms depending on 
whether it is grounded in Kant or in Hegel.  See R. MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34, at 68–101 
(drawing on Kant); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
(drawing on Hegel). 
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persona—her will—into the world and as such becomes intimately tied up with the 
creator’s personhood.  The theory posits that a creation tightly bound up with 
personhood should be protected against acts that would injure or break the highly 
personal bond.131   
Personhood theory has more built-in limits than Lockean theory.  The personhood 
bond exists only in certain settings and only for certain kinds of property.132  For 
example, it is easy to see personhood at work in a painting, but much more difficult 
to see it forged by the process of invention in a commercial setting.133  Moreover, 
the core rights that personhood theory recognizes are different than Lockean rights.  
These rights protect the special bond between creator and creation and thus target 
only actions that threaten that bond. 
Personhood theory is much more influential in other countries than it is in the 
United States.  Many European nations, for example, recognize so-called “moral 
rights” that are justified on personhood (or personality) grounds.134  Moral rights 
include the right of attribution (a right to have authorship credited), the right of 
integrity (a right to stop others from mutilating one’s work), the right of disclosure 
(a right to control first publication), and the right to withdraw or retract a work if the 
work no longer fits the creator’s artistic vision.135  In the United States, however, 
moral rights have received only limited recognition.  Section 106A of the Copyright 
Act gives rights of attribution and integrity, but only for works of visual art in limited 
edition.136  Several states grant somewhat broader rights but not nearly as broad as 
European moral rights.137   
Still, personhood theory influences copyright rights in a number of more subtle 
ways, and scholars debate the extent of this influence.138  For example, restrictions 
on fair use for unpublished works are justified in part by an author’s interest in 
 
 131. Or put slightly differently, ensuring the stability of the personal connection between creator and 
object is essential to the projection of will, which in turn is essential to the realization of self.  See R. 
MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34, at 76–77; Radin, supra note 130, at 972–75. 
 132. See Radin, supra note 130, at 986–91 (distinguishing personhood property from fungible 
property). 
 133. But see R. MERGES, JUSTIFYING, supra note 34, at 17–18 (arguing that Kant’s theory might 
have broader scope). 
 134. See Henry Hansmann & Maria Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights:  A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 95 (1997).   
 135. See id. at 95–96.   
 136. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (defining works of visual art); 
17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (defining the rights). 
 137. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 134, at 97 (noting “[a]t least 11 states now explicitly 
recognize moral rights in greater or lesser degree”). 
 138. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Owners’ Putative Interests in Privacy, Reputation, and 
Control:   A Reply to Goold, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE (2017) (reviewing the debate).  One scholar has 
even tried to assimilate personhood theory to utilitarianism by arguing that concern for the personality 
interests of creators helps to stimulate the creation of IP.  Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in 
Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1760 (2012).  The point is useful, but it does not collapse 
personhood into utilitarianism.  Personhood theory is a moral theory.  It does not have to do with how 
creators feel about the creative enterprise or their works, nor does it have to do with incentives to create.  
It focuses ex post on the bond between creator and her creation, and that bond exists independently of how 
the creator feels about it. 
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creative control tied to personhood values,139 and some view the derivative work 
right as a vehicle for indirectly protecting what is in essence a moral right to 
integrity.140 
Thus, it is reasonably clear that personhood is relevant to copyright law even if 
U.S. copyright law gives it only limited recognition.  And a personhood bond is 
created whether or not a work is used.  Even so, personhood-based rights are limited 
and infringement depends on what others do with the work.  As we shall see in Part 
III’s discussion of orphan works, very few nonuse cases involve third party uses that 
offend personhood values.141 
One additional point deserves mention here.  Professors Liivak and Penalver 
argue that personhood theory requires the creator to attend in a deliberate way to the 
creative object.142  Attention need not be continuous or even substantial, in their 
view, but it must be genuinely present.  They conclude that personhood is unlikely 
to support rights in a creation that is simply cast aside.  If this is correct, personhood 
theory would seem to point toward denying enforcement when the creator is a 
complete nonuser. 
However, the issue is more complicated.  Liivak’s and Penalver’s conclusion is 
in some tension with a moral right to withdraw or retract a work.143  Withdrawal and 
retraction are associated with rejection and thus complete nonuse.  Moreover, while 
it might be necessary to attend in a deliberate, even active, way to forge an initial 
personhood bond, it is not clear that continued attention is necessary to maintain that 
bond.144  Personhood has more to do with the nature of the work and its relationship 
to the author than with what the author does or does not do with the work after the 
relationship is forged.   
To illustrate with a concrete example, consider a personal diary that is stored in 
an attic and never shown to others or read.  Suppose someone happens to come across 
the diary while visiting the author and decides to publish its contents.  Because of the 
highly personal nature of a diary, it seems reasonable to suppose that publication 
without consent might do violence to the personal connection between author and 
diary even though the author does not use the diary at all.  Still, this depends very 
 
 139. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 140. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 6, at IV-185 (“The law of derivative works is one way in which 
a personality or “moral rights” aspect creeps into U.S. copyright law.”).  But see Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 
F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 1997) (arguing against using the derivative work right in section 106(2) to 
enforce moral rights). 
 141. See infra notes 241–246 and accompanying text.  Moreover, the same contractarian (and 
reciprocity-based fairness) arguments used to justify limits on Lockean rights might also justify limits on 
personhood rights.  See supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text. 
 142. Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 1471–72 (arguing that this requirement follows from the 
fact that person-object connections result from the rational exercise of will).  
 143.  In response, one might argue that personhood values support a right to withdraw only initially, 
when the bond with the work is still meaningful.   
 144. I am indebted to my colleague Oren Bracha for alerting me to this point. 
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much on the nature of the work.  One might feel differently, for instance, about a 
novel stored in the attic.145  
Thus, personhood theory has different implications for nonuse in different 
settings.  In Part III below, I explore its implications for complete nonuse in the 
setting of orphan works.  
C. TRADEMARK 
1. Background 
In contrast to patent and copyright, trademark law in the United States requires 
use.  To secure rights in a mark, the owner must actually use the mark to sell goods 
or services in the ordinary course of trade.146  While the Lanham Act lets a firm 
reserve a mark for a limited period of time prior to use by applying for an intent-to-
use registration, it still requires use before the mark can be registered.147  
2. Normative Analysis  
Trademark law prioritizes use because trademark serves different purposes than 
patent and copyright.  The main purpose of patent and copyright is to incentivize the 
creation of inventions and works of authorship.  Trademark law does not care about 
incentivizing the creation of marks.  Its primary purpose is to facilitate the 
transmission of information to consumers in the marketplace and protect seller 
goodwill.148  Like patent, trademark law rests primarily (though not exclusively) on 
a utilitarian foundation, but the utilitarian benefits differ.  From a utilitarian 
perspective, trademark aims to reduce consumer search costs and maintain high 
product quality.149 
To illustrate, consider the mark CREST for toothpaste, which is sold by Procter 
& Gamble.  By preventing other firms from using CREST for their toothpaste, 
trademark law assures that every tube with the mark CREST comes from the same 
source (i.e., Procter & Gamble) as every other tube bearing the same mark.  Knowing 
this, and assuming the seller will maintain uniform quality, consumers can rely on 
 
 145. However, consider Franz Kafka’s instruction in his will that all his unpublished manuscripts 
should be destroyed, an instruction that Max Brod, his close friend and executor, thankfully ignored.  See 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 830–31 (2005).  While most people 
applaud Brod’s decision, they also understand the moral dilemma Brod faced.  That dilemma has partly 
to do with Brod’s role responsibilities as executor of Kafka’s estate, but it also has to do with a sense that 
Kafka’s request has moral force given the personal nature of unpublished manuscripts.   
 146. 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9 § 16:18. 
 147. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (authorizing an intent-to-use 
application for registration requiring a bona fide intent to use the marks in commerce within a six-month 
period but requiring actual use for registration); 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 19:13.  
 148. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2118, 
2120 (2004). 
 149. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 2:2; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. 
Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
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the mark CREST to easily retrieve information about the toothpaste that they learn 
from advertising, experience, and word-of-mouth.  In this way, trademark law 
reduces consumer search costs. 
Moreover, Procter & Gamble can use the mark in its advertising to communicate 
to consumers that its toothpaste is high quality; for example, that it has superior 
cavity fighting properties.  This allows it to reap the benefits of selling a high-quality 
product, which, in turn, gives it an incentive to maintain high quality.  If Procter & 
Gamble’s competitors were free to use CREST for their toothpaste, they would have 
an incentive to sell lower quality CREST toothpaste that is cheaper to manufacture, 
knowing that consumers will not be able to tell the difference.  Anticipating this, 
Procter & Gamble will lower the quality of its toothpaste to meet the lower price and 
retain its customer base.150 
The success of trademark law in promoting these two goals depends on the fact 
that consumers rely on the CREST mark to indicate a single brand of toothpaste.  For 
that to happen, Procter & Gamble must actually use CREST as a mark to sell 
toothpaste.  Without use of the mark in trade, consumers would have no way to adopt 
the mark as a source-identifier.  And source-identification is essential to the mark’s 
ability to convey information to consumers.   
Although this utilitarian justification is central to trademark law, natural rights 
theories like Locke’s have also exerted some influence.151  The Lockean idea 
depends on the notion that marks carry goodwill and that a mark’s goodwill, as a 
valuable asset, is the property of the trademark owner who invested in creating it.152  
Any other firm that uses the same mark to sell its own products appropriates the 
trademark owner’s goodwill and infringes the owner’s natural right. 
Nevertheless, the influence of Lockean theory on trademark law is quite limited, 
and even this limited influence is hard to justify.153  Trademark law has never 
extended as far as Lockean theory would support.  A Lockean-based trademark law 
would impose liability whenever goodwill is appropriated regardless of whether 
consumers are confused or the mark itself is harmed.  But trademark law has never 
protected a seller’s goodwill from appropriation alone.154  For our purposes, it is 
enough to note that the Lockean natural right depends on the existence of goodwill, 
 
 150. Thus, trademark law prevents a lemons problem.  See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market 
for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 151. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 
181–84 (2010) (noting and criticizing natural rights theories of trademark law). 
 152. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill:   A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 567–75, 592–615 (2006) [hereinafter Bone, Hunting Goodwill].  
 153. For a critique, see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 151, at 181–84; Robert G. Bone, Taking the 
Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”:  Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark 
Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1355–57 (2012) [hereinafter Bone, Taking the Confusion Out].   
 154. Even anti-dilution protection is not triggered merely by appropriation of goodwill; it requires 
an injury to goodwill, either an impairment of the distinctiveness of the mark or a use that tarnishes it.  See 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).  
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and goodwill can be created only through public use of a mark.  Thus, use is central 
to rights in Lockean theory as well.155 
Sometimes courts refer to trademark law in ways that suggest a personhood 
theory.156  The best way to understand this is to imagine a firm’s brand as embodying 
the firm’s identity in much the same way as an individual’s name embodies the 
individual’s personal identity.  On this view, using the brand is tantamount to 
corporate identity theft and breaks the personhood bond between the corporation and 
its brand identity.157  There are many reasons to reject this theory as a justification 
for trademark rights, including that corporations, as artificial entities, cannot form 
personhood bonds or possess a moral right to personal identity.158  But the important 
point here is that even if personhood had a role in trademark law, it would require 
public use, since use is necessary to forge identity in a mark.  
Given the centrality of use to all three normative theories, one might expect that 
a trademark owner would lose its right to protect its mark whenever it ceased using 
the mark with no intent to resume use.  Trademark law does have an abandonment 
doctrine that applies in these circumstances, and when it applies, it results in the 
trademark owner forfeiting its rights.159  However—and herein lies the nonuse puzzle 
for trademark law—courts sometimes refuse to find abandonment even when the 
owner has stopped using the mark and has no definite plans to resume use.  In other 
words, trademark law sometimes protects owners even in circumstances of nonuse.  
Part III explains why.  
 
 155. One might argue that merely selecting a mark involves mixing labor with the things of the 
world.  But with the exception of a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, American trademark law 
has rightly rejected the notion that there can be property in the mark itself and focused instead on property 
in the mark’s goodwill.  Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 152, at 561–72. 
 156. See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928); see also Bond Stores, Inc. 
v. Bond Stores, Inc., 104 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1939) (“The annoyance felt by those who do business 
under a corporate name when the same name is used by others, is very much akin to that of the 
patronymically proud, when a newly admitted citizen assumes their family name.”); Premier-Pabst Corp. 
v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 1935) (rejecting the notion that the right to a 
name or mark is part of goodwill that should be protected exclusively, and instead basing the right on the 
“common-law right of a man to have such an identity in the public eye as he can win by his conduct and 
personality”). 
 157. This is analogous to a publicity rights violation, where publicity rights are based on personhood 
values.  See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Public Personas and Private Property:  The Commercialization 
of Human Identity, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 689 (1989) (“In an effort to expand the scope of rights in 
corporate symbols and trademarks, some plaintiff’s attorneys have tried to stuff these kinds of corporate 
and business symbols into the category of the right of publicity.”); Ellen P. Winner, Right of Identity:  
Right of Publicity and Protection for a Trademark’s “Persona”, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1981) 
(arguing for broad trademark rights by analogy to publicity rights).  
 158. See Bone, Taking the Confusion Out, supra note 153, at 1357–61 (criticizing the personhood 
theory on these and other grounds). 
 159. 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 17:1.  If the owner refrains from using the 
mark for three years, the Lanham Act creates a presumption that the mark has been abandoned.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (subpart (1) of the definition of “abandon”).  The owner then can rebut the presumption, but only 
with evidence showing an intent during the three-year period to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable 
future.  3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 17:11. 
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III. CONCRETE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOME IP PROBLEM AREAS 
Part II outlined a general normative framework for analyzing use requirements in 
different IP fields.  Whether use should be required for IP rights depends on the 
relevant body of IP law and the nature of the problems that nonuse creates.  The 
following discussion examines three problems, one for each body of IP law.  These 
problems include PAEs, orphan works, and abandoned marks with residual goodwill.  
The discussion applies the normative analysis developed in Part II to address these 
problems and evaluate possible solutions.  
A. PATENT PAES (TROLLS) 
1. The Problem 
How to deal with PAEs (or patent trolls) is one of the most controversial and 
pressing issues in patent law today.160  PAEs are pervasive.161  Indeed, empirical 
evidence shows that they are responsible for more than half of the patent suits filed 
in the United States.162   
According to some commentators, PAEs confer social benefits by acting as 
intermediaries for small inventors who cannot afford to exploit patents themselves 
and by making it easier for large firms to monetize their patents, thereby fueling 
incentives to create.163 Also, some PAEs, by aggregating many patents, realize 
economies of scale that reduce the costs of licensing.164  Other commentators, who 
are less favorably disposed to PAEs, focus on PAE costs.  They question how much 
inventors actually receive from PAEs165 and argue that patent aggregation generates 
costs as well as benefits.166  Most importantly, they stress the fact that PAEs engage 
in holdup and frequently use poor quality patents to do so.167  As a result of this 
 
 160. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 634 (2018) (noting 
the “intense debate” over the social welfare consequences of patent troll litigation); Chiang, supra note 
27, at 692 & n.1 (“In patent law, commentators spend much time debating what constitutes a “patent troll,” 
whether these “trolls” are a problem, and, if so, why”). 
 161. Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2123. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in 
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 427 (2014); David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent 
Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 66–68 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Mass Aggregators]; 
James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll:  An Alternative View of the Function 
of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 223 (2006). 
 164. See generally Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2126–27 (describing three different 
patent troll business models, including the aggregator model); Schwartz, Mass Aggregators, supra note 
163, at 56–61 (further refining the category of mass aggregators). 
 165. Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2125.  The answer probably varies with the type 
of PAE.  See Schwartz, Mass Aggregators, supra note 163, at 63. 
 166. Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2153–61.  
 167. On the pervasiveness of holdup, see Chiang, supra note 27, at 694.  On weak patents, see Robert 
P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls:  Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603–04 (2009) (discussing some of the factors that contribute to excessively broad and 
weak patents). 
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holdup strategy, technology users end up paying more than the value of the patents 
asserted against them and are forced to incur the costs of defending unjustified 
suits—all of which chills innovation.168  
This is not the place to resolve this debate.   Assuming that there is a PAE problem, 
and most people believe there is, the question for our purposes is whether and how 
nonuse—here, strategic nonuse—contributes to the problem, and whether some kind 
of use requirement should be part of the solution.169  This question must be answered 
even if some PAEs are beneficial on balance.170  If sorting between good and bad 
PAEs is efficient, then the following analysis applies only to the bad PAEs.  If sorting 
is inefficient, then it applies to all PAEs.171 
2. The Role of Nonuse 
The fact that PAEs engage in strategic nonuse is important to the utilitarian 
analysis in several ways.172  For one thing, nonuse affects the benefit side of the 
balance.  Even if PAEs add some social benefits, they do not add nearly as much 
benefit as practicing entities that innovate and commercialize their patents.173  
Moreover, although PAEs might assist small inventors, it is unclear how much small 
inventors actually receive from PAEs.174  It is also unclear whether small inventors 
need PAEs to commercialize their patents.  They can assign those patents to firms 
that will work them, or hire brokers to license third-parties before the third party has 
irreversibly invested in use.   
 
 168. See, e.g., James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of 
Patent Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26 (2011).  I believe there are two distinct problems that concern critics of 
PAEs, but are not always clearly distinguished.  One problem is that users pay more than the patent’s 
value because of holdup exacerbated by royalty stacking, high litigation costs, and the like.  The second 
problem is that PAEs enforce patents too efficiently and aggressively and thus disrupt the under-
enforcement equilibrium that is essential to the vitality of the patent system.  See Schwartz, Mass 
Aggregators, supra note 163, at 66–69.   
 169. The problem of unused patents in the hands of practicing entities is also worth attention, but 
those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 170. See Schwartz, Mass Aggregators, supra note 163, at 66–69; Bessen et al., supra note 168, at 
28.  
 171. If some PAEs are good and some bad, an approach that targets only the bad PAEs requires 
some way to distinguish bad from good.  Doing so is bound to be costly, and if those costs are high enough, 
it might be better to treat all PAEs in the same way.   
 172. One might argue that PAEs should be condemned on moral grounds regardless of how they 
fare in a utilitarian analysis.  If holdup is morally blameworthy—which seems quite sensible given its 
close affinity with extortion—it should matter for moral evaluation that a PAE builds its entire business 
model around holdup.  See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the district court found “indicia of extortion” in what was in effect a holdup strategy). 
 173. See Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2167 (“Trolls may do less good for society, 
so even when their patents and practices are not worse than those of practicing entities, we are less willing 
to put up with those practices when they are undertaken by trolls.”); Richard A. Posner, Patent Trolls, 
BECKNER-POSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013), http://perma.cc/386K-5PUC (“It is extremely difficult to discern 
any possible social benefit from trolls, and extremely easy to discern substantial social costs.”).  
 174. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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On the cost side of the balance, the nonuse factor exacerbates PAE problems and 
increases the costs PAEs generate.  As mentioned previously, nonuse facilitates 
holdup by making it difficult for others to learn about the patent in time to work 
around it or license it prior to an irreversible investment.175  To be sure, all patents 
are registered, so theoretically they are available to the public.  However, most PAEs 
operate in the IT and software industries, where technological innovation is so fast-
paced that it is common for firms to market devices with components covered by 
not-yet-published patent applications.176  Even if all the relevant patents have issued, 
it can be extremely difficult to search the registry and catch them all, especially when 
a single device can have hundreds of thousands of components under patent.177  This 
problem is even more severe because uncertainty about patent scope is common in 
the software and IT industries.178   
Nonuse contributes in other ways as well.  Because PAEs do not actually use the 
patents they acquire, they have stronger incentives to collect weak patents than do 
practicing entities.179  A PAE might enforce its patents more aggressively because it 
has no other source of revenue, does not have to worry about its reputation in the 
industry, and can impose discovery costs asymmetrically.180 
3. A Proposed Solution 
Some commentators argue that the best way to address the PAE problem is to 
require use as a condition for enforcement of patent rights.  One proposal would 
apply the use requirement to all patent cases.181  As we saw in Part II, however, 
conditioning enforcement on use for all cases can depress incentives to create and 
increase enforcement costs.182  
 
 175. See Chiang, supra note 27, at 695 (“Holdup situations generally arise only when there is an 
element of surprise”).   
 176. Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2148. 
 177. For example, smartphones can incorporate hundreds of thousands of separate components 
covered by software patents belonging to others.  Id. at 2147–48 (noting an estimate that “a smartphone 
uses technologies claimed by 250,000 patents” and suggesting that even more patents might be involved 
today). 
 178. It is also worth mentioning that patent notice or marking requirements apply only to practicing 
entities.  Chiang, supra note 27, at 700. 
 179. See Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2126, 2147 (describing “bottom feeder” PAEs 
and noting that trolls are not constrained in the types of patents they acquire). 
 180. Id. at 2161–63. 
 181. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 173 (proposing a solution that would bar enforcement of a patent 
not reduced to practice within a reasonable time after the patent grant).  See generally Chiang, supra note 
27, at 710 (“a theory that regards non-practicing patent holders as the problem leads logically to a policy 
prescription that patent law should require patentees to practice”) (emphasis in the original).  
 182. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.  A more moderate version would apply the use 
requirement only to suits against independent inventors.  See, e.g., Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 
1479–82.  This more limited requirement reduces the negative impact on licensing, since independent 
inventors, by definition, are unaware of the patented invention and thus not in a position to seek a license.  
But it requires judicial determinations of whether a defendant independently invented, which is bound to 
be difficult and likely to add substantially to enforcement costs.  After all, every defendant would have an 
incentive to claim that it independently invented. 
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Some commentators prefer solutions that do not depend on use at all.183  
Professors Lemley and Melamed, for example, favor targeting the underlying 
features of the patent system that make strategic opportunism profitable, including 
the PTO’s practice of granting a multiplicity of broad patents on small 
improvements, patent law’s excessively generous remedial rules, and the high costs 
of patent litigation.184  If these features are essential to the environment that nurtures 
socially perverse PAE practices, then eliminating them should go a long way to 
choking off those practices. 
Needless to say, we should try to correct flaws in the patent system whenever it 
makes sense to do so.  But there is no assurance that the PAE problem can be 
adequately addressed in this way.  Even if one could reduce the number of software 
patents, perhaps by tightening the nonobviousness requirement, claim interpretation 
rules would still create uncertainty about scope.185  Adjusting patent damages rules 
would be helpful, but measuring damages under more limited rules can be difficult.  
And as the history of procedural reform in recent decades demonstrates, it is very 
hard to reduce litigation costs by changing procedural rules without also increasing 
error costs or creating other problems.186 
An intermediate solution is preferable.  We should correct flaws in the patent 
system to the extent we can, but we should also employ a tailored use requirement.187  
The idea is to allow patent enforcement by users, temporary nonusers, and perhaps 
functional nonusers when it makes sense in the particular case—but not by strategic 
nonusers or complete nonusers.188   
We saw in Part II that patentees should be allowed to enforce patent rights in cases 
of temporary nonuse but not in cases of complete nonuse.  The strategic nonuse that 
characterizes PAEs should be treated the same as complete nonuse: enforcement 
should be barred in those cases as well.  To be sure, an inventor deciding how much 
to invest in invention will expect less economic return when assignment to a PAE is 
off the table.  But, as already noted, it is not clear that original inventors receive much 
today when they assign their patents to PAEs.189  In any event, the negative incentive 
 
 183. Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2172.  
 184. See id. at 2172–78.  See also Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 163, at 427–28 (“We submit that 
the debate [about NPE litigation] should focus on the merits of the lawsuits or the actions of the parties in 
the litigation, or both, and not on the parties’ identities,” in particular whether or not they are NPEs). 
 185. Bessen et al., supra note 168, at 28, 34 (arguing that a critical feature of the PAE business 
model involves taking advantage of the “fuzzy boundaries” of software patents).  
 186. For example, increasing sanctions for meritless filings or imposing a more onerous pleading 
burden to screen meritless suits also deters meritorious suits and risks generating higher litigation costs.  
See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE:  THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 125–57 (2003) 
(analyzing pleading rules).  
 187. Any use condition should apply only to patent enforcement and not to the grant of a patent in 
the first place.  One of the important goals of patent law is to incentivize early disclosure that cuts off the 
patent race and enables downstream innovation.  Delaying a patent application undermines this disclosure 
goal.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 188. Recall that functional nonuse should be handled on a case-by-case basis.  See supra notes 76-
81 and accompanying text.  
 189. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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effects are not likely to be large in the aggregate, given all the other options for 
exploiting an invention.190 
It is true that courts will have to sort cases of strategic nonuse from cases of 
temporary and functional nonuse (but not from cases of complete nonuse because 
enforcement is barred there as well).  However, this should not be much of a problem.  
Distinguishing strategic nonuse from temporary nonuse should be fairly 
straightforward in most cases.  By definition, a PAE does not have current plans to 
license its patents (except by asserting them against productive users should any 
appear).  Therefore, the PAE will have no evidence to support a claim to temporary 
nonuse.  Sorting between strategic nonuse and functional nonuse should also be fairly 
easy.  A PAE might argue that it keeps unused patents in order to signal information 
to external observers about firm attributes; however, in the case of PAEs, it should 
be obvious that this claim is just a ploy.  The typical PAE has no research department 
and thus no R&D information to signal.  Owning many patents might mean that the 
PAE is strong, but not because of any unobserved attributes that the patent portfolio 
signals.  Lots of patents make a PAE strong because the PAE is in the business of 
asserting patents. 
A PAE might respond to a rule barring enforcement by creating a small research 
department, adding a licensing component to its business, or even commercializing 
some of its patents—and then pretending that it is actually doing innovative research 
or that its unused patent is part of this licensing or commercialization scheme.  
However, the PAE would still have to establish that its research is genuine and not 
just a ploy to avoid being classified as a PAE and that a bona fide connection exists 
between any unused patents and the commercial part of its business.  This should be 
hard to do for a PAE with a business model focused on strategic nonuse and holdup.  
Furthermore, any adjustment that involves research, bona fide licensing, or 
commercialization on a scale that could conceal a patent assertion strategy will make 
it costlier for PAEs to operate and thus should reduce the number of PAEs.  
One advantage of this proposal is that it does not require a court to identify holdup 
on a case-by-case basis.191  For a patentee to enforce patent rights, it must be a user, 
a temporary nonuser, or possibly a functional nonuser.  Thus, a court need only check 
that the patentee’s nonuse does not qualify as temporary or functional.  As explained 
above, that should not be difficult to do. 
This proposal is not offered as a complete solution to the PAE problem.192  But a 
tailored use requirement that includes a bar to enforcement in cases of strategic 
 
 190. Also, the adverse impact, if any, on incentives is already taken into account in our assumption 
that strategic nonuse is socially undesirable.  If strategic nonuse is undesirable on utilitarian grounds, it 
must be because the marginal social costs of the practice exceed the marginal benefits, and those marginal 
benefits include whatever positive effects the presence of PAEs have on incentives to invent. 
 191. See Chiang, supra note 27, at 711 (explaining that identifying a holdup strategy would be 
extremely difficult). 
 192. Professors Liivak and Penalver, for example, propose conditioning an award of reasonable 
royalties on efforts to commercialize the invention. Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, at 1490.  This 
proposal mitigates a PAE’s ability to threaten high damages, but it does nothing to reduce the PAE’s 
ability to threaten high litigation costs.  Other commentators have proposed compulsory licenses that allow 
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nonuse has enough promise on utilitarian grounds to be considered part of any 
solution.193   
B. COPYRIGHT-PROTECTED ORPHAN WORKS 
1.  The Problem 
An orphan work is a work for which the current copyright owner cannot be 
identified with reasonable effort.194  These are usually works with copyrights that 
have passed through multiple owners, so any copyright notice no longer indicates 
who actually owns the copyright and the long ownership chain makes tracing 
impractical.  To illustrate, suppose that the original author and copyright owner of a 
novel dies, leaving the copyright to her heirs.  The heirs then assign the copyright (or 
their shares of the copyright) to others, who die and pass the copyright on to their 
heirs, who assign it again, and so on.  Now suppose someone who wishes to include 
portions of the novel in her own work seeks permission to do so.  She checks the 
copyright notice on the book, which lists the original author’s name as copyright 
owner.  But she quickly discovers that the author is dead.195  She then checks with 
the Copyright Office to see if there is any record of what happened to the copyright 
and discovers that transfers of ownership need not be recorded and, as is usually the 
case, were not recorded for this novel.196  Our potential user does some additional 
checking but quickly hits a wall.  Unable to trace the ownership chain, she either 
 
others to use the patented technology as long as they pay a compulsory license fee to the PAE.  Trimble, 
supra note 2; cf. Saunders, supra note 25, at 434–36 (proposing a compulsory licensing scheme for 
handling anti-competitive suppression).  However, compulsory licensing regimes are costly to administer.  
The additional costs compared to an outright bar might be worth incurring if the compulsory licensing 
fees paid to PAEs added sufficiently to invention incentives, but it is far from clear that they will. 
 193. If nonutilitarian justifications based on Lockean natural rights or personhood were also 
important to patent, the analysis would be different, although the conclusion might be the same, as the 
discussion of orphan works in Section III.B. indicates. 
 194. See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION 9 (June 2015) 
(hereinafter 2015 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS) (noting that the first Copyright Office Report on Orphan 
Works in 2006 defined them as “any original work of authorship for which a good faith prospective user 
cannot readily identify and/or locate the copyright owner(s) in a situation where permission from the 
copyright owner(s) is necessary as a matter of law”); Hansen et al., Orphan Works, supra note 88, at 3 
(defining orphan works as “copyrighted works whose owners cannot be located by a reasonably diligent 
search”).  This is the standard definition and it is the one that best fits our problem of nonuse.  Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that some commentators have expanded the definition to include works which have 
identifiable owners but which cannot be licensed because of high transaction costs  See David R. Hansen, 
Orphan Works:  Definitional Issues, at 1 (Berkeley Digital Library Copyright Project White Paper No. 1), 
https://perma.cc/X22K-D5P7; Stef van Gompel, The Orphan Works Chimera and How to Defeat It:  A 
View From Across the Atlantic, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1347, 1349–50 (2012) (drawing distinctions 
along these lines).  
 195. To make matters even worse, since the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988, 
there has been no copyright notice requirement.  Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-568, § 7 (1988).  
 196. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2010) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
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refrains from using the work or uses it without permission, thereby risking a later suit 
by the current copyright owner.197  
The orphan work problem is pervasive.198  Empirical studies show that orphan 
works comprise a large portion of library and archive collections and encompass 
most types of copyrightable subject matter, including books, articles, letters, 
photographs, diaries, newspaper and magazine clippings, and home movies.199   
The orphan work problem also generates high social costs.  Third parties who 
wish to use orphan works in histories, documentary films, movies, and even various 
forms of web-based, user-generated content might choose not do so for fear of later 
suit.200  The result is a potentially serious chilling effect on downstream creativity 
and a significant impediment to socially beneficial uses.201 
Indeed, the risk of suit is particularly daunting for third party users because of the 
prospect of high litigation costs, possible injunctions, and liability for statutory 
damages (assuming the copyright has been registered).202  The Copyright Act gives 
a copyright owner the option of receiving statutory damages up to $150,000 for each 
work infringed if the owner chooses not to prove actual damages.203  So even when 
the copyright owner suffers little or no harm from the use (as is likely for orphan 
works that are completely unused) and the user receives very little economic benefit 
(as is true for much user-generated content), the copyright owner can still threaten 
the user with the prospect of having to pay substantial statutory damages.204    
 
 197. See Hansen et al., Orphan Works, supra note 88, at 12-14 (describing a number of factors that 
produce orphan works). 
 198. Id. at 4–11; 2015 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 194, at 2 (“the orphan works 
problem is widespread and significant”). 
 199. Hansen et al., Orphan Works, supra note 88, at 3, 5–14.  It is true that Section 108 gives libraries 
and archives certain rights to reproduce and distribute—and in the case of Section 108(h), which applies 
to works within the last twenty years of their copyright term, also display and perform—but these rights 
are subject to conditions and strict limitations.  17 U.S.C. § 108 (2005) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
115-231).  More importantly, they apply only to libraries and archives and not to third party users. 
 200. In addition, although many libraries have digitized their collections through participation in the 
Google Book Project, they still face copyright problems making the digital documents, including orphan 
works, available to the public in effective ways.   
 201. See, e.g., id. at 14–23.   
 202. Hansen et al., Orphan Works, supra note 88, at 3, 11, 30.  
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).  In ordinary infringement 
suits, the statutory damages range from $750 to $30,000 per work infringed but that amount can increase 
to as much as $150,000 in cases of willful infringement.   
 204. It is important to note, however, that educational institutions, libraries and archives are 
protected from paying statutory damages if they have reasonable grounds to believe that their use is a fair 
use under Section 107.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2010) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).  Also, 
courts are allowed to reduce statutory damages all the way down to $200 per work if they find that the 
defendant was not aware and had no reason to believe that it was infringing.  Id.  Still, these exemptions 
and limitations depend on uncertain factual findings, so the prospect of being saddled with substantial 
statutory damages remains a serious risk, especially for risk-averse individuals and institutions.  See 
Hansen et al., Orphan Works, supra note 88, at 11 n.49. 
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2.  The Role of Nonuse 
Although nonuse is not part of the definition, it is a common characteristic of 
orphan works.205  In a typical scenario, the copyright passes to new owners who lack 
interest in the work or simply ignore it because they believe it has no value.  While 
ultimately an empirical question, it seems reasonable to suppose that most orphan 
works involve complete nonuse.  Indeed, complete nonuse increases the likelihood 
that a work will become an orphan, since complete nonuse leaves few, if any, clues 
to the owner’s identity.206   
It is important to remember that what matters for the analysis is whether the 
copyright owner uses the work.207  A library or archive where the work is deposited 
might allow public access and maybe even display or perform the work.  This is use 
under my definition, but it is use by the library or archive, not use by the copyright 
owner. 
Complete nonuse matters normatively to whether a copyright owner should be 
able to assert its rights against third-party users, regardless of whether the normative 
theory is utilitarian, Lockean, or personhood-based.  As I explain below, all these 
theories point to barring complete nonusers from enforcement in the typical orphan 
work situation and allowing third parties to use the work without compensation.  This 
is significant because it runs directly counter to current proposals for handling orphan 
works, which focus on assuring that copyright owners have an opportunity to receive 
compensation for the use.208 
In 2015, for example, the Copyright Office proposed that copyright owners of 
orphan works be limited to “reasonable compensation” (which assumes they should 
receive some compensation).209  Proposed legislation followed a similar approach.210  
Scholars have floated proposals based on eliminating statutory damages (but 
allowing ordinary damages), imposing limited remedies, and creating compulsory 
 
 205. See, e.g., Urban, supra note 87, at 1396–98 (describing orphan works as “economically 
abandoned” and as works “whose authors have left them to languish”); Chiang, supra note 27, at 695, 
700, 707 (arguing that orphan works involve holdup, which is based on surprise). 
 206. The other possibility is strategic nonuse. See Chiang, supra note 27, at 695, 700, 707 (arguing 
that orphan works involve holdup).  However, strategic nonuse does not fit orphan works all that well.  To 
be sure, the orphan work copyright owner threatens suit after a use is made and demands statutory damages 
in excess of any actual harm it suffers or any profit the user makes.  But it is hard to imagine that an orphan 
work copyright owner acquires orphan copyrights just to lay in wait and spring them on users, as PAEs 
do for patents.  Still, it does not really matter as far as the result is concerned whether the nonuse is 
complete nonuse or strategic nonuse since the optimal response is the same: bar enforcement of the 
copyright.  
 207. See supra Section I.B.  
 208. Chiang, supra note 27, at 706; Urban, supra note 87, at 1389. 
 209. 2015 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 194, at 11.  Moreover, the proposal conditioned 
the reasonableness limit on the user conducting a reasonably diligent search for the owner.  Id.  
“Reasonable compensation” would be measured in terms of the market value of the work immediately 
before the defendant’s infringing use began.  Id. at 63–64. 
 210. See id. at 11–13. 
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licensing schemes, all conditioned on reasonable efforts by the user to identify the 
copyright owner.211 
All of these proposals assume that the optimal goal is to locate the copyright 
owner and reunite her with her work so that the third-party user can negotiate a 
license, or if that is not feasible, to replicate what would have happened if the owner 
and user had been able to negotiate in advance.212  My proposal—an outright bar to 
enforcement—rests on a different assumption; namely, that a copyright owner has 
no legitimate reason to enforce her rights or demand compensation when she 
completely ceases using the work and has no continuing interest in it. 
3. A Proposed Solution 
The following analysis justifies barring enforcement and denying compensation 
by showing that the case for enforcement is weak on utilitarian, Lockean, and 
personhood grounds.   
a. Utilitarian Analysis 
As discussed above, the social costs of protecting orphan works, including the 
chilling effect on socially beneficial activities and downstream creation, are 
substantial.213  This means that protecting orphan works must generate substantial 
incentive benefits to outweigh these costs.  This is highly improbable.214  Roughly 
speaking, a prospective creator deciding how much to invest in creation is not likely 
to pay much attention to possible economic return in the distant future when her work 
becomes an unused orphan.  She will focus instead on the potential economic gain 
from licensing and selling her work while the work still has market value and 
potential buyers can still identify the copyright owner and enter into deals. 
To illustrate, imagine a prospective creator, X, contemplating whether to create a 
work.215  The incentive argument for copyright assumes that X takes account of the 
expected future revenue stream from her work and will invest more when the 
expected revenue is greater.216  With copyright protection, X can be confident that 
she will be able to profit from selling and licensing her work while she owns the 
copyright.  The question is how much additional revenue she is likely to expect from 
knowing that copyright protection will also be available after she no longer owns the 
copyright and her work becomes an unused orphan.  The answer is very little.  
 
 211. Chiang, supra note 27, at 706; Urban, supra note 87, at 1389.   
 212. Chiang, supra note 27, at 703–04. 
 213. See supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Randal C. Picker, Private Digital Libraries and Orphan Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1259, 1283 (2012) (drawing a similar conclusion).   
 215. To assess incentive effects, one must focus on the world at the time an author decides whether 
and how much to invest in a creative project.   
 216. It also assumes that the prospective creator is economically motivated and that economic 
benefits are subject to declining marginal utility.  It is also worth noting that authors of some orphan 
works, such as personal letters and diaries, are not likely to care much at all about copyright protection if 
and when their work becomes an orphan.  In these cases, the incentive-based utilitarian rationale clearly 
supports free access to the work. 
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There are several reasons for this.  First, X knows that whatever work she creates 
will not become an orphan while she owns the copyright (since her identity will be 
readily ascertainable) and that during this period she can benefit from active sales 
and licensing if the work turns out to have sufficient value.  Even if she assigns the 
copyright to someone else, she knows that the price of the assignment will reflect the 
market value of the work while it is still being used.  This is the period of greatest 
economic gain to her and therefore the period she will focus on when estimating the 
expected benefit from creating the work.   
Second, whatever work X creates will have lost most of its market value by the 
time it becomes a completely unused orphan, so X will expect very little additional 
economic benefit from copyright protection at that stage.217  This follows from the 
fact that works of value tend to be used by their owners.  Moreover, the owner of a 
valuable work has strong incentives to make her identity readily known (through 
posting to the web and other means), so orphan status is unlikely for valuable 
works.218  To be sure, in many orphan work cases, changing technology has opened 
up new uses for the work and new sources of value.  But future technological 
advances and new uses are not likely to be reasonably foreseeable to X at the much 
earlier time when X creates the work.219  There might be exceptions, of course, but 
predictions are based on the ordinary, not the exceptional, case.220 
If X expects her work to yield very little, if any, revenue after it becomes a 
completely unused orphan, X will not care much about whether her work is protected 
by copyright at that stage.  As a result, her incentives to create the work in the first 
place will not be materially affected by the prospect of copyright protection for the 
 
 217. See Picker, supra note 214, at 1282–83.  By the time the work becomes an orphan, ownership 
of the copyright will likely have passed through many hands, so the original creator will not benefit 
directly.  But the creator can benefit indirectly by, for example, charging more for an assignment of 
copyright to reflect the fact that the work can be protected if it becomes an orphan.  Still, the additional 
amount she receives will be very small for the reasons stated above and because of the uncertainties 
associated with the chain of ownership. 
 218. See id. at 1283.   
 219. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 57, at 213.  This is, after all, why 
the work loses value; no one thinks of the new use until the defendant does.  Even if X can foresee future 
technological advance that might affect the work, she will have to put a very small probability on it 
happening and this probability will discount whatever value the work might have.   
 220. This is, of course, the standard economic approach to analyzing rational choice under 
conditions of uncertainty by using expected values.  See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 53, at 43–
46 (discussing expected value and rational choice).  To be more precise, X will consider all possible future 
states of the world.  For each such state, X will estimate the probability that it will happen, call that pi 
(where the subscript i indexes all the possible states), and also estimate the economic value of her work in 
that state, call that vi.  The total expected value to her at the time she decides whether to create is:  p1 × v1 
+ p2 × v2 + . . . . + pn × vn, discounted to present value (where n is the number of states).  One of these 
states is the possible world where the work has become a completely unused orphan; let’s say that’s the 
nth state in this formulation.  My point is that for the reasons discussed in the text, a rational X will estimate 
a very small vn, so that pn × vn will also be very small (since pn < 1) and dominated by the other terms—
and that is true even before any discounting to present value.   
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unused orphan.221  This tiny private benefit for creators will yield only a tiny social 
benefit in terms of any marginal increase in ex ante incentives.222 
A utilitarian analysis balances this small marginal benefit against the social costs 
of allowing enforcement or delivering compensation to the copyright owner in other 
ways.  These costs are likely to be substantial.  If compensation is delivered through 
a compulsory licensing scheme, as some commentators have proposed,223 substantial 
administrative costs will be required to create and oversee the scheme.224  If 
compensation is delivered through litigation, there will be litigation costs.  If 
monetary relief is limited to “reasonable compensation,” there will be costly judicial 
inquiries into historical market values and costly adversarial battles over what is 
reasonable.225  
This analysis makes empirical assumptions, as all proposals do.  However, the 
empirical assumptions are quite reasonable.  To be sure, people are not perfectly 
rational, but introducing bounded rationality constraints likely only strengthens the 
conclusions.  Since people tend to be overly optimistic about their own success, 
creators will be inclined to underestimate the likelihood that their creations will 
become so valueless that they are ignored.226  In any event, this analysis presents a 
strong case on utilitarian grounds for handling the orphan work problem by barring 
enforcement of copyright rights in all situations of complete nonuse.227 
Unlike current proposals, this outright bar does not require that the defendant first 
search for the copyright owner; all it requires is orphan status and complete nonuse.  
 
 221. See Picker, supra note 214, at 1281–83.  
 222. Moreover, the small future revenue stream will have to be discounted to present value and this 
will reduce the expected revenue even further.  See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra 
note 57, at 213 (“because of discounting to present value, incentives to create intellectual property are not 
materially affected by cutting off intellectual property rights after many years”).  This is especially so if, 
as seems reasonable, X will assume that whatever she creates will not become a completely-unused orphan 
work for a long time. 
 223. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Landes & Posner, supra note 64, at 358 (noting that compulsory licensing schemes “would 
be likely to entail substantial costs”).  For example, a compulsory licensing scheme must include a process 
for clearing potential licensees and periodically setting royalty rates.  Moreover, it needs some way to 
enforce the license should a compulsory licensee stop paying royalties.  For an overview of copyright 
compulsory licensing schemes and a critical take on compulsory licensing, see Robert P. Merges, Of 
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2668–69 (1994). 
 225. A useful comparison is to the reasonable royalty measure of relief in patent infringement cases.  
The courts often frame this inquiry in terms of a hypothetical bargain between a willing seller and a willing 
buyer, and they use a fifteen-factor test, known as the Georgia-Pacific factors, to determine the reasonable 
royalty.  1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 25, § 20.07.  This test is heavily criticized for generating high 
costs and considerable uncertainty.  See Lemley & Melamed, Trolls, supra note 15, at 2143–44.   
 226. If people tend to be excessively optimistic about future events that affect their self-interest, as 
the bounded rationality literature teaches, a creator will be overly optimistic about the success of its 
creation.  Picker, supra, note 214, at 1283. 
 227. It is true that the fair use doctrine is available to allow use and bar enforcement in some cases.  
See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Urban, supra note 87, at 1383–84.  But fair use applies only to uses by defendants 
that satisfy the multi-factor fair use test, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), and that test itself invites costly litigation 
and produces uncertain outcomes which can chill creativity.  My proposal, which bars copyright for all 
unused orphan works, avoids costly fair use inquiries. 
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A prospective user might conduct a search anyway to confirm that the work is an 
orphan, but orphan status should be pretty clear in most situations.  Also, if ordinary 
efforts by the user to identify the copyright owner are unsuccessful and the copyright 
owner has taken no steps to help others trace ownership (such as by posting easily 
accessible identification information to the web), it makes sense to create a legal 
presumption that the work is an orphan.228  The important point is that search is not 
a requirement in my proposal.229  Current proposals require search because they aim 
to deliver compensation to the copyright owner.  An outright bar rejects this goal.  
Compensating owners of completely unused orphan works makes no sense on 
utilitarian grounds when ex ante incentives are key.  
b. Lockean Analysis 
At first blush, it might seem that Lockean natural rights would justify giving 
copyright owners broad control over orphan works.230  However, as we saw in Part 
II, there are limits to Lockean rights:  the spoilage and sufficiency provisos justify 
limits and contractarian theory does so as well.   
First, consider the spoilage proviso.  As we have seen, the spoilage proviso can 
be interpreted to cover IP even though IP does not spoil in the same way physical 
goods do.231  The idea is to find waste when nonuse threatens to dissipate all of the 
value of the IP.  This fits a scenario where the IP owner ignores the work and does 
nothing to develop or exploit it.   
Still, for many orphan works, the current copyright owner refrains from using the 
work only after it has lost its value.  This, however, can also count as waste.  Often, 
third party uses reflect the fact that the work has acquired a new value because of 
technological change, such as the advent of digital technology.  Without the user 
creating the new use, the copyright owner would likely continue ignoring the work 
and overlook whatever novel creative opportunities the new technology presents.  
Ignoring the opportunity for novel uses is no different than ignoring the opportunity 
to develop or exploit the work in the first place.  In both cases, the copyright owner’s 
actions dissipate the value of the work by failing to even consider potential uses for 
 
 228. It should be possible to specify the different sources that a user must check in order to meet the 
condition of ordinary effort, and doing so will provide clear notice in advance and minimize chilling 
effects.  Under the outright bar approach, however, a user does not have to check if she is otherwise 
confident that the work is an orphan. 
 229. Some commentators would impose a duty on the copyright owner to take reasonable steps to 
make itself locatable in order to minimize search costs.  See, e.g., Ariel Katz, The Orphans, the Market, 
and the Copyright Dogma:  A Modest Solution for a Grand Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1285, 
1306–08 (2012).  Such a duty might help third parties confirm orphan status, but its function is different 
when search is not required.   
 230. Professor Chiang mentions that the orphan work literature seems dominated by a “deeply 
entrenched” idea that the copyright owner has “an inherent right to control and get paid for its work.”  
Chiang, supra note 27, at 698.  This idea is most compatible with a Lockean theory, even though 
supporters of copyright protection for orphan works do not make the connection explicitly.  
 231. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. 
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it.  Thus, it is reasonable to charge a copyright owner with waste if the owner 
completely ignores any chance that the work might acquire new value over time.232   
The sufficiency proviso does little to limit protection for orphan works when 
third-party users have access to lots of other creative material.  However, the 
principle of free use, which we derived in Part II by applying a contractarian 
approach, can do more work.233  According to this principle, when A is a complete 
nonuser and ignores her work, she has an obligation to allow B’s creative use, except 
when B’s use seriously interferes with A’s own creative interests as an author.  The 
reason is that A would have agreed to such a principle if she were bargaining behind 
a veil of ignorance knowing that she could be either an owner or a user after the veil 
is lifted.  This principle fits the typical orphan work scenario involving complete 
nonuse quite well.  In this scenario, the copyright owner ignores the work and does 
nothing to be locatable (such as by entering identification information on the web).234  
When someone then uses the work without permission, the owner threatens to sue or 
actually files suit for statutory damages and injunctive relief, and does so in the usual 
case despite the fact that the use causes no harm to the author’s creative interests.235  
Under these circumstances, the copyright owner violates the principle of free use by 
threatening suit and pursuing litigation, thereby impeding creative use by others.236  
This analysis assumes that bargaining agents would agree to a principle that 
authorizes free use of orphan works.  One might argue that bargaining agents would 
instead agree to allow use only when the user is willing to pay an amount not in 
excess of the private benefit that the user receives from using the work.237  Assuming 
prospective users are willing to engage in a use whenever their benefit equals or 
exceeds the cost of compensating copyright owners, this alternative principle 
rewards the owner without impeding the use.  The problem, however, lies in the 
assumption that use will not be chilled.   
To see this point clearly, imagine a third party interested in using an orphan work 
but unable to locate the copyright owner and negotiate a license in advance.  The 
potential user knows that if she uses the work without permission, the copyright 
owner might appear and insist on compensation after the fact.  In an ideal world, the 
amount of compensation paid would not exceed the user’s benefit.  However, in the 
real world, the copyright owner can leverage the high costs and risks of litigation to 
 
 232. This ground for denying enforcement of copyright rights might depend on the copyright 
owner’s state of mind.  While it is very likely that most owners of completely-unused orphan works pay 
no attention to potential uses, it is conceivable that some might, in which case all would have incentives 
to pretend that they did.  However, fakers will have difficulty marshaling objective evidence to support 
their claims.   
 233. See supra notes 120–128 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Katz, supra note 229. 
 235. In the typical case, the user’s creation does no violence to the integrity of the work or adversely 
affect any other creative personhood interest of the copyright owner or the original author.  See infra notes 
241–246 and accompanying text. 
 236. This point warrants more development than space permits, but I hope this brief discussion is 
enough to indicate the argument’s force.  
 237. I am grateful to Professor Wendy Gordon for suggesting this compensation option. 
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insist on payment in excess of reasonable compensation.238  Faced with this risk, our 
potential user might avoid using the work altogether, especially if she is risk-averse.  
Thus, harm to the user is a real possibility even with a modest compensation 
requirement.239  And bargaining agents behind the veil know enough about the real 
world to be aware of these risks. 
The principle of free use, however, applies only to those who make creative use 
of an orphan work, such as using it in films, books, or user-generated content.  Some 
uses of orphan works might not involve creative contributions, such as a use that 
improves public access to the work.  However, if the social costs of chilling these 
uses are high enough, Lockean rights might have to give way.  Although natural 
rights like Locke’s are, in theory at least, supposed to resist utilitarian arguments for 
imposing limits, as a practical matter they must yield to social costs when those costs 
are serious enough and the resulting limitation is not too burdensome for the right 
holder.240 
c. Personhood Analysis 
As we saw in Part II, personhood theory supports different, and in some ways 
more limited, rights than Lockean theory.241  The moral rights usually associated 
with personhood include the right of attribution, right of integrity, right of disclosure, 
and right to withdraw the work.  The right of attribution is not at issue when a third 
party uses an orphan work; the user can easily credit the copyright owner if the owner 
has a right to be credited.  Nor is the right of disclosure implicated, since the work 
has had enough public disclosure for the third party to have access to it.  And the 
copyright owner in the typical orphan work case has no interest in withdrawing the 
work; instead, she wishes to be compensated for its use.242   
 
 238. In particular, a prospective user knows that there is a risk of error in valuing the private 
benefit—a court might value it more than the actual value—and also that she will have to pay litigation 
costs if the copyright owner sues.   
 239. One might argue that this result can be avoided by creating a compulsory license and setting 
the royalty amount equal to the average benefit from using the work.  However, a compulsory license will 
not eliminate chilling effects for those prospective users who value the use less than the average amount.  
Moreover, such schemes are costly to create and administer, and it is difficult to see how the benefits 
generated by furnishing what is likely to be a small amount of compensation in most cases could be worth 
these additional costs.  See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 240. When a work is a completely-unused orphan, the latter condition is easily met.  In fact, if high 
social costs impair other rights of comparable moral worth, such as First Amendment rights to free 
expression, even Lockean theory must recognize limits to accommodate the rights-conflict. 
 241. See supra notes 130–141 and accompanying text. 
 242. There might be some exceptions.  But few of the exceptions are likely to involve orphan works.  
For example, suppose that A sends a personal letter or email to B with the expectation that B will keep it 
confidential.  When A becomes famous, B gives the letter or email to a library or archive without A’s 
knowledge, and C copies from it to create a work of her own.  See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 
811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).  One might argue that A has a personhood-based privacy interest that justifies 
allowing A to withdraw the email or letter from public view and maybe stop C from using it.  However, 
even if this conclusion is correct on personhood grounds, the hypothetical does not involve an orphan 
work.  C can easily ascertain A’s identity by reading the letter or email, in which case C can try to get A’s 
permission if C wishes to do so.  More generally, the orphan work problem involves obstacles to 
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This leaves the right of integrity.243  In most orphan work scenarios, the third-
party user does nothing to trigger this right.  She simply uses the work, or portions 
of it, in a new way that does no violence to the work’s integrity.  However, the 
integrity right is relevant to situations where a third party uses the work in a way that 
conflicts sharply with the original author’s artistic vision.  Yet even in these cases, 
the right has little force.244  The personhood connection that matters normatively is 
the connection of the original author with her work, and because orphan work 
copyrights usually have passed through many hands, the party asserting rights in an 
orphan work will typically not be the original author.245  Indeed, even countries that 
recognize broad moral rights on personhood grounds stop short of allowing 
purchasers to enforce a right of integrity.246  
In sum, nonutilitarian theories of copyright yield conclusions very similar to those 
derived from a utilitarian analysis.  Everyone should be free to use a completely 
unused orphan work, perhaps with the additional conditions that the copyright owner 
not have taken any steps to be locatable and that the use does no violence to the 
integrity of the work.  These additional conditions are very likely to hold for most 
orphan works and for most uses of those works.  
C. TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT 
As Part II explained, a firm must use a mark in trade before that mark can become 
a source identifier capable of communicating product information to consumers and 
symbolizing seller goodwill.247  When a trademark owner stops using a mark without 
any plans to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable future, it abandons the mark 
and forfeits trademark rights to it.  The mark then becomes available for anyone to 
use.248 
 
identifying the current copyright owner when that owner is not the original author, but a personhood-
based right to withdraw a work belongs to the original author.   
 243. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 134, at 95. 
 244. The text explores the normative force of personhood theory in general, but it is worth noting 
that IP law in the United States strongly disfavors a right of integrity grounded in personhood values.  Id. 
at 96.  Such a right fits U.S. law very poorly and, by impeding expression, raises serious First Amendment 
concerns.  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 6, at IV-228–29; Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 263, 272–83 (2009). 
 245. Of course, the original author might still be alive and wish to assert her integrity rights even 
though she has parted with ownership of the copyright.  However, the problem with orphan works has 
nothing to do with original authors enforcing rights; it has to do with current copyright owners asserting 
their copyright in an effort to obtain payment from users. 
 246. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 134, at 121.  Indeed, the most well-known example of a right 
against mutilation in U.S. law—the rights of authors of limited edition works granted by § 106A of the 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A—is nontransferable.  It is worth mentioning, however, that European 
law allows the right of integrity to pass to an author’s heirs upon the author’s death.  Hansmann & Santilli, 
supra note 134, at 122–23.  It is possible that some orphan works are owned by heirs who have maintained 
ownership rather than sold the copyright to others. 
 247. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.  Trademark law is unusual among IP theories in 
having a doctrine of abandonment by nonuse.  Copyright recognizes an abandonment defense, but it 
requires proof of an intent to abandon and mere nonuse is insufficient.  4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
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This seems reasonably tidy.  But there’s a problem with the trademark 
abandonment doctrine.  To illustrate, suppose that after many years selling shampoo 
under the mark AFARION, X decides to discontinue its AFARION line and stops 
using the mark completely.  Suppose, however, that a substantial segment of the 
consuming public continues to associate AFARION with X.  If X is deemed to have 
abandoned the mark because of nonuse, other firms are free to adopt it.  If firm Y 
adopts AFARION and applies it to shampoo that is inferior in quality, consumers 
might buy Y’s inferior shampoo thinking that it is X’s superior product and end up 
harmed by their confusion.   
This is the problem of residual goodwill.249  Residual goodwill is the goodwill 
that remains after use, and it exists because consumers still use the mark as a source 
identifier for X even after X ceases using it.  On the one hand, nonuse pushes in favor 
of abandonment.  On the other, residual goodwill pushes in favor of continued 
protection.  Courts in the United States have grappled with this tension, but for the 
most part unsuccessfully.250  Facing significant residual goodwill, many courts 
search for some kind of use—even peripheral or incidental use—to avoid an 
abandonment finding.251  This creates the puzzling result that a trademark owner 
retains trademark rights even though it has ceased using the mark in the ordinary way 
and has no intent to resume use. 
This doctrinal puzzle reflects confusion at the policy level.252  It stems from 
mistakenly thinking of trademarks as property and trademark law as conferring 
property rights.253  Abandonment in property law turns on the property owner’s intent 
 
note 82, § 13.06.  Patent law’s abandonment doctrine affects only initial patentability.  This doctrinal 
difference is probably due to differences at the policy level.  When a mark is unused, it can lose its source-
identifying meaning, and when that happens, trademark policies no longer justify protecting it.  By 
contrast, when a patent is unused, the patent does not necessarily lose the value that matters for patent 
law.  The same is true for copyright, arguably even more so because of the influence of nonutilitarian 
theories. 
 249. See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 17:15. 
 250. See id. (noting circuit conflict over the issue).  See generally Jake Linford, Valuing Residual 
Goodwill After Trademark Forfeiture, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 811 (2017). 
 251. See, e.g., Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, No. 86-1812-
B(IEG), 1989 WL 298658, at *7–8, *12-13 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 1989) (finding that the sale of repair parts 
for the discontinued Daytona Spyder was enough to avoid abandonment of trade dress rights in the face 
of substantial residual goodwill); First Nationwide Bank v. Nationwide Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 682 F. Supp. 
965, 979 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (finding that continued use of old mark on checkbooks after the company 
changed it maintained sufficient goodwill to “preclude[] abandonment”).  Cf. Emergency One, Inc. v. 
American FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (relying in part on the existence of residual 
goodwill to justify a jury finding of an intent to resume use when the trademark owner ceased to use the 
mark).  But see Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that even strong residual goodwill cannot save a mark from abandonment).  
 252. As we saw in Part II, personhood theory should have no place in trademark law.  See supra 
notes 156–158 and accompanying text.  But assuming it had a place, maybe on a theory that brands 
embody firm personality, its force should be much diminished when a firm stops using its brand with no 
intent to resume use, just as it is for a person who changes her birth name.   
 253. This is probably a holdover from the property theory that supported the tort of technical 
trademark infringement in the late nineteenth century.  See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 152, at 
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to relinquish her rights.254  Faced with a risk of consumer confusion due to residual 
goodwill but confined to the property model and its focus on intent, courts downplay 
obvious signs of abandonment in order to continue protecting the mark. 
Trademarks, however, are not property in the ordinary sense and trademark law 
is not a property theory.255  There is no question that trademark law, whatever else it 
might do, serves the utilitarian goal of conveying accurate information to consumers 
and ensuring a well-functioning competitive market.256  This utilitarian rationale 
focuses not on protecting the mark as property of the trademark owner, but on 
protecting the mark as a device for communicating information to the market.257   
If enough consumers still treat the mark as a source identifier capable of 
communicating information even after the trademark owner has ceased using it, the 
utilitarian rationale supports protecting the mark from uses by others that are likely 
to cause harmful confusion—unless, of course, the costs of affording protection are 
too high.  For example, when Y uses the mark AFARION on an inferior quality 
shampoo, consumers who still believe the mark signifies X will assume, wrongly, 
that Y’s products are higher quality than they actually are.  As a result, consumers 
are harmed and X’s reputation is put at risk.  These are classic concerns of trademark 
law. 
Once we get rid of the idea that trademark protection should turn on the trademark 
owner’s intent, we no longer need to pretend that the owner is still using the mark 
when it really is not.  It is much more straightforward to recognize that a mark can 
sometimes still receive protection when the owner has stopped using it.  Although 
the owner no longer has a trademark interest, others cannot use the mark when doing 
so would confuse a substantial number of consumers.   
 
560–72 (describing this early property conception, its eventual demise with the rise of legal realism, and 
its lingering effects today). 
 254. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 4.03[B][1] (2000) (stating that the 
abandonment of a chattel requires that “the owner intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes all right, title, 
and interest in it”); Donald J. Kochan, Keepings, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 355, 373–74 (2015).  For a useful 
discussion of abandonment for personal property and water rights, see Liivak & Penalver, supra note 16, 
at 1455–58 (noting that intent to abandon is required but that intent can be inferred from a history of 
nonuse combined with other objective factors).   
 255. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 151, at 181–84.  Unlike ordinary property owners, 
trademark owners do not have even prima facie rights to exclude all others from using their marks or even 
from appropriating the mark’s goodwill if they do not mislead.  Rather, trademark owners have rights 
against those who use the mark in ways that cause consumer confusion (or, in some cases, that injure the 
mark through dilution).  
 256. It is worth noting that if a Lockean theory actually fit trademark law, it might well tie 
abandonment to the property owner’s intent, since Lockean theory focuses on securing the property 
owner’s natural right and on consent as the primary basis for transferring or otherwise altering the right.  
See generally Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:  An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 138 (1990) (noting 
“Locke defined property as that which without a man’s own consent . . . cannot be taken from him”) 
(internal citations omitted).  However, as we saw in Part II, Lockean theory does not fit trademark law 
very well at all.  See supra note 153-154 and accompanying text.  Nor does personhood theory.  See supra 
notes 156–158 and accompanying text.  Still, even if one or both of these theories played a role and 
supported forfeiture of rights with nonuse, the utilitarian theory would still call for protection to avoid 
consumer harms 
 257. See supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text. 
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This situation—where trademark law continues to protect a mark even though the 
trademark owner has lost its rights—also arises with generic marks,258 and in that 
setting courts have figured out a much more sensible response.  To illustrate, suppose 
a firm has a patent on a product and enjoys a monopoly for the duration of the patent.  
At the beginning of the patent term, consumers use the firm’s trademark as a source 
identifier for the product and the mark receives trademark protection in the ordinary 
way.  Suppose, however, that after a period of time, consumers find it convenient to 
refer to the product itself by the mark.  For example, THERMOS was once a 
trademark for a vacuum-insulated bottle sold by King-Seeley, but over time 
consumers gradually appropriated the word THERMOS as the name for the general 
type of product and used it to refer to any vacuum-insulated bottle regardless of the 
seller.259  The same thing happened to CELLOPHANE, ASPIRIN, MURPHY BED 
and many other marks.260  They all began as protectable marks that designated a 
single source of the product, but over time they became generic terms that consumers 
used to refer to the general type of product no matter who sold it.  
When a majority of consumers switch from using the mark as a source identifier 
to using it to refer to the general product type, the mark is deemed to be legally 
generic and the owner loses its trademark rights.261  But—and here is the important 
point—because the transition from source identifier to generic takes time, it often 
happens that a substantial, though ever-diminishing, minority of consumers still use 
the mark as a source identifier even after it has become generic.262  Although it is not 
referred to as residual goodwill, this situation in effect presents a residual goodwill 
problem very similar to the problem that arises in the abandonment setting.  The 
trademark owner loses its trademark rights because the mark has become legally 
generic—just as the trademark owner loses its trademark rights when the mark is 
abandoned—but there is still residual goodwill because a substantial minority of 
consumers continue to treat the mark as a source-identifier.  
The law of genericity handles this problem in a sensible way.  Other firms can use 
the mark if they wish, but when they do, they must take reasonable steps to reduce 
the risk of confusion, such as by adding a conspicuous disclaimer or prefacing the 
mark with their own firm name or another trademark.263  For example, in the King-
 
 258. See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 12:51. 
 259. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963).   
 260. For these examples, see Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100–
01 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 261. See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 12:6. 
 262. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1999); 2 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 12:51. 
 263. See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, § 12:51; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 4, § 15 cmt. d.  This apparent paradox—the trademark owner has no rights but 
still can sue a competitor if there is a risk of consumer confusion—is papered over by using a different 
label, “unfair competition” or “passing off,” to refer to the cause of action and the limited remedy.  See, 
e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  A 
court might say, for example, that the former owner has no trademark rights because the mark has become 
generic, but can still obtain relief by bringing a passing off or unfair competition claim.  In fact, however, 
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Seeley case, the Second Circuit held that THERMOS had become generic and the 
defendant Aladdin Industries could use the term, but it also ordered Aladdin to 
preface its use of THERMOS with its own trademark ALADDIN and never use the 
terms “original” or “genuine”—all in order to reduce the risk of confusion for the 
substantial minority of consumers who still used THERMOS as a source-identifier 
for King-Seeley’s vacuum-insulated bottles.264  Later, when the process of genericide 
was almost complete and very few consumers still used the mark as a source 
identifier, the Second Circuit held that the district court could modify the injunction 
so that Aladdin might use THERMOS without any restrictions.265  
This same approach should be applied to abandonment.266  More specifically, if 
residual goodwill in an abandoned mark is strong enough, the benefits of avoiding 
consumer harm and reputational injury are likely to exceed the costs of continuing 
to protect the mark.267  In that case, the mark should receive full protection, just as if 
the owner were still using it.  As the residual goodwill weakens, the social benefits 
of protecting the mark decline, until the cost-benefit balance no longer supports full 
protection.  The optimal form of protection then should depend on the strength of 
residual goodwill.  Marks with moderately strong goodwill should receive the same 
kind of protection that generic marks receive in those cases where a substantial 
minority of consumers still use the mark as a source identifier.  Other firms would 
be free to use the mark, but only if they take reasonable steps to mitigate confusion 
risks, such as by adding something to the mark itself or attaching a conspicuous 
disclaimer. 
In sum, a utilitarian analysis points to a three-pronged approach.  For very weak 
residual goodwill, the mark should receive no protection at all and others should have 
unhindered access to it.  From a utilitarian perspective, the benefits of protecting the 
very few consumers who still use the mark as a source identifier do not justify the 
costs of requiring firms to use precautionary measures.  For moderate residual 
goodwill, others should be free to use the mark, but only if they take reasonable steps 
to reduce the risk of confusion.  For very strong residual goodwill, the mark should 
receive full trademark protection, and others should be barred from using it.268   
 
these are just formal labels without functional significance.  The important point is that the owner can still 
protect the mark against uses that risk confusion. 
 264. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 581.  
 265. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1969). 
     266.     See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 4, § 30 cmt. a (suggesting a 
similar approach to mitigate consumer confusion after abandonment); Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson 
LaLonde, The Zombie Trademark: A Windfall and A Pitfall, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1280, 1301-03 (2008) 
(recommending a similar approach for abandoned “zombie” marks and noting the analogy to genericity). 
 267. After all, the benefits must have exceeded the costs when the mark was used or trademark 
protection would not have been justified.  If the strength of goodwill declines continuously, there should 
be a range where benefits still exceed costs even after the firm has stopped use.  
 268. In other words, the mark, while technically abandoned because of nonuse, would still be 
protectable in order to safeguard consumers, and the most sensible party to enlist in this effort is the former 
trademark owner.   
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This proposal requires further development.269  But the important point for our 
purposes is that a sensible approach to nonuse is possible only by taking account of 
the policies that justify extending legal protection to IP.  This was true for patent and 
copyright, and it is true for trademark as well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a question:  Why not require use as a condition for 
enforcement of IP rights?  The question is tricky because use seems necessary to reap 
the social value that IP rights are supposed to produce.  A careful examination of this 
question revealed that use should be required sometimes, but not always.  As we saw, 
IP use and nonuse take different forms, and each form has different implications for 
IP rights depending on the IP legal theory (patent, copyright, or trademark), the type 
of IP that is protected (inventions, works of authorship, or source-identifying marks), 
and the normative justification for granting rights (utilitarian, Lockean, or 
personhood).  It makes sense to tolerate some types of nonuse under some 
circumstances, and for this reason use requirements should be tailored to the 
particular problems that nonuse creates. 
This insight was applied to three specific problem areas:  PAEs, orphan works, 
and residual goodwill.  Nonuse matters to the PAE problem, and a limited use 
requirement should play a role in its solution.  More specifically, patent enforcement 
should be allowed only in cases of use, temporary nonuse, and maybe functional 
nonuse in some instances, and enforcement should be barred in all cases of strategic 
nonuse and complete nonuse.  As for orphan works, there is no compelling reason to 
extend copyright protection to unused orphan works in the typical case or to deliver 
compensation to the copyright owner, especially when the owner takes no steps to 
make itself locatable.  The residual goodwill problem in trademark law focuses on 
the status of nonuse in circumstances where use is the baseline.  By analyzing the 
problem at the policy level, we were able to formulate a sensible solution that varied 
with the strength of residual goodwill.   
The general lesson is clear.  A sound approach to IP use is possible only by taking 
account of the policies that justify extending legal protection to IP.  This approach 
offers the best hope of formulating legal rules that optimally accommodate the 
important interests at stake. 
 
 269. For example, if it is too costly to measure the magnitude of residual goodwill and sort it into 
the three categories, it might make sense to collapse the second and third categories and use only two:  
cases where the mark can be used freely, and cases where the mark can be used but only by taking 
reasonable confusion-reducing measures.  
